Post date: 07 Aug 2006
- by: Juwono S.
The crisis in the Lebanon is already a month old since Israeli forces entered south Lebanon in search of two of its soldiers abducted by Hizbullah, the Shite-based and Iran-backed militia, following an Israeli corporal who was initially taken as prisoner in late May.
A flurry of meetings in the capitals of the Middle East, Europe, the United Nations, North America and even Asia took place to find a “ceasefire”, “cessation of hostilities” and other diplomatic formulations that usually are banded around, each hoping against hope that “international concern” and “pressure of public opinion” will bring some degree of “stability” to what is essentially a tense, complex and difficult military situation on the ground.
In late July, the European Union floated the idea of a “multinational force” consisting of France, Italy, Norway and Turkey which would constitute “a robust force” to bring about some kind of military stand-off . Heads of states and of governments in Arab capitals differ in their approaches to seek a solution, depending on the respective Arab government’s strategic attitudes toward Israel, Lebanon and Iran. The UN in New York issued its predictable litany of diplomatic statements, underlining its helplessness in having credible leverage over any of the protagonists. The US Secretary of State rather awkwardly wanted “a ceasefire in days, not weeks” but found her words undercut by intensified shelling and missile attacks by both Israel and Hizbullah. Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the Organization of Islamic Conference called on the UN Security Council to be more assertive in condemning Israeli aggression.
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Post date: 24 Jul 2006
- by: Juwono S.
Back in mid-January 2006, in a regular meeting between the Defense Ministry, the Commander of the Defense Force and the three service chiefs, agreement was reached that given the circumstances facing Indonesia’s location within “the Ring of Fire”, the Defense Force (TNI) would concentrate more on “military operations other than war” rather than focusing defense outlays beefing up its on strike forces. “Professionalism” of the military in the narrow sense was out of the question anyway since the “total defense and security” doctrine (sishankamrata) which Indonesia espoused since the revolutionary years of 1945-1950 obliged every Indonesian citizen to take part in the total defense and security of the country.
Now that the Indonesian Government is now simultaneously undertaking recovery and rehabilitation problems following the earthquake in Yogyakarta and Central Java of May 27 (6000 plus dead), the recent tsunami of July 17 in West and Central Java (550 plus dead), followed by the recent July 23 quake in Gorontalo in Sulawesi, the TNI is again gearing up to prepare its limited resources to deal with yet another natural disaster.
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Post date: 12 Jul 2006
- by: Juwono S.
The Indonesian Parliament recently passed two landmark legislation . On July 11, the Aceh Governance Act was passed, after over 5 months of debate following the agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) reached at Helsinki in August 2005. The agreement was brokered by the European Union and representatives from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). All credit to Interior Minister Muhammad Maaruf and his staff who tirelessly defended that the any provisions of the MOU with GAM must pass the litmus test of Indonesian sovereignty as provided in the Indonesian Constitution of 1945.
GAM had insisted, for example, that the Indonesian Defense Force (TNI), should exclusively deal with “external defense” and that only the Indonesian Police be assigned to internal security duties. This demand runs counter to article 30 of the Indonesian constitution which stipulates that all Indonesian citizens are obliged to participate in the “total defense and security” of the nation. Hence, the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines of the TNI (and even civilians) have an important role to play in supporting police in internal security affairs.
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Post date: 01 Jul 2006
- by: Juwono S.
For the past eighteen months, the most talked about issue in Indonesian policy circles has centered on governance as the key solution to Indonesia’s economic recovery. Governance__both in officialdom, as well as in corporate as well as in civic society__was the key to stabilizing the economy as macro economic indicators began to improve: inflation was well under control, the government’s reserves peaked at $43 billion, economic growth rate at a respectable if not spectacular 5,4%, and there are plans to repay ahead of schedule the IMF $2.4 billion__about half of Indonesia’s outstanding debt.
Governance was the issue at all levels__national, provincial, local (regency, district) because the key problem since May 1998 was that as Indonesia was becoming democratic (at least for those who can afford it and whose basics needs are met) everyone recognized that democracy had to be substantiated by efficacy. The ability of the government, of private corporations and of all civic groups to make things happen and get things done rested on this single ability to energize government, corporations and advocacy groups.
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Post date: 23 Jun 2006
- by: Juwono S.
No defense ministry and defense force in all of South East Asia has been subjected to more international scrutiny about its role in the life of the country than the Indonesian Defence Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia). Since President Soeharto, a retired general, stepped down in May, 1998, the TNI reform process has been periodically in the forefront of news coverage by national and international media, none more so than the of the ”military businesses” owned, operated by or linked to any one of the tri-services, Army, Navy and Air Force.
Most domestic and foreign analysts, particularly NGOs, incessantly find fault with almost anything and everything the TNI (especially the army) did, is doing and will do in the future. The anti-military tone is partly in the nature of most NGOs anywhere, and is deeply rooted in the liberal western lexicon of “civilian supremacy” or “civilian control” and the predictable language of “transparency and accountability. Much of the reporting of the TNI__most recently revealed in the June 2006 Human Rights Watch Report entitled “Too High a Price: The Human rights Costs of the Indonesian Military’s Economic Activities” is coloured in the HRW report, the phraseology of which draws upon events that took place in Indonesia before May 1998.
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Post date: 20 Jun 2006
- by: tacoen
