Setiap akhir tahun berbagai kalangan di dunia menerbitkan survei kemajuan demokrasi di beberapa negara maju maupun negara berkembang.

Masing-masing survei membuat kajian berdasarkan selera ukuran dan indikator masing-masing.Ada yang mengedepankan “keterbukaan politik” seperti kemerdekaan pers, kebebasan berserikat, penghormatan pada golongan minoritas (suku, agama, dan ras). Ada juga yang mendasarkan pada besaran “golongan menengah” masingmasing negara. Survei bisnis dan ekonomi umumnya mengacu pada kemampuan pengelolaan utang publik maupun utang swasta serta kemampuan pengendalian fiskal negara.

Indonesia telah lama disebut sebagai “negara demokrasi terbesar ketiga”, setelah India dan Amerika Serikat, sedikitnya menurut hasil Bali Democracy Forum yang diselenggarakan 9-10 Desember 2010.Namun,beberapa kalangan mempertanyakan tolok ukur yang dipakai untuk pemeringkatan seperti itu.

Terutama kalangan aktivis yang menekankan pentingnya demokrasi ekonomi,sosial,dan budaya sebagai sandaran matra demokrasi dalam arti luas. Karena tolok ukur yang berbeda, muncul berbagai interpretasi tentang makna keberhasilan demokrasi di negara-negara seperti India, China,Brasil,dan Indonesia.

Kalau ditinjau dari tolok ukur hak asasi manusia (HAM) dalam lima matra yang utuh (kebebasan sipil, politik, ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya), tidak ada negara maju maupun berkembang yang sempurna menjalankan demokrasi. Di India dan China, misalnya, yang masing-masing berpenduduk 1,1 dan 1,3 miliar manusia,hanya 300-350 juta orang yang memenuhi tolok ukur HAM secara utuh.

Jumlah orang India yang mampu secara ekonomi dan sosial menikmati “demokrasi ” hanyalah 300 juta yang menduduki “kelas menengah” India dengan pendapatan per kapita antara USD3.000-6.000 per tahun. Selebihnya, sekitar 700 juta manusia, belum terjangkau hak ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya.

India pemeringkat pertama demokrasi dunia kalau diukur hanya dari 2 matra HAM,yaitu kebebasan sipil dan kebebasan politik.Dari segi hak ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya, lebih dari 700 orang India terjerat dalam kenistaan yang menyedihkan.Demokrasi “gaya Westminster” tidak bersendikan keadilan dan kewajaran sosial, ekonomi, dan budaya.

“Kelas menengah” di China juga hanya berkisar 300- 350 juta orang yang sudah menikmati “kenaikan kelas” ekonomi selama 30 tahun kemajuan pesat China sejak 1979. Tetapi, rakyat China yang di pedalaman dan hidup jauh dari pusat-pusat ekonomi China di sepanjang kota-kota pantai selatan masih bergelut dengan perusakan lingkungan, penurunan kesehatan,dan kemiskinan yang amat mencengkam. Mukjizat“Konsensus Beijing” tidak bersendikan lima matra HAM yang utuh.

Mukjizat Brasil yang kerap dipuja- puja kalangan media negara maju juga tidak kalah memprihatinkan. Ketimpangan ekonomi antara kaya dan miskin,antara kota industri dan hutan di pedalaman, pembunuhan terhadap kaum miskin kota.

Di sejumlah negara Eropa Barat sekarang sedang dikaji sampai di mana demokrasi Inggris, Prancis, Jerman, dan Italia bisa luput dari menjeratnya utang negara yang dialami Yunani, Spanyol, dan Irlandia.Pengelolaan uang negara jadi ukuran penting demokrasi yang sejati karena jaminan sosial ekonomi dari negara terancam beban pengetatan fiskal.

Di Amerika Serikat (AS), jawara demokrasi negara paling kaya di dunia,utang negaranya bahkan sudah mencapai 66% dari pendapat domestik bruto. Dana talangan pemerintah sebesar USD850 miliar lebih dipakai dan dinikmati oleh 13 bank swasta terbesar yang asetnya mencapai USD10,5 triliun.

AS mungkin demokrasi politik kedua terbesar di dunia; tetapi AS adalah suatu oligarki perbankan/keuangan di Wall Street, yang juga menguasai komisi-komisi ekonomi dan keuangan di DPR dan Senat AS. Reformasi layanan kesehatan untuk 30 juta orang AS tersendat oleh DPR dan Senat Amerika yang dikuasai lobi-lobi industri obat dan kesehatan yang amat kuat.

Terlepas dari debat demokrasi politik dan demokrasi ekonomi mancanegara, bagaimana demokrasi Indonesia? Jika ditinjau dari segi lima matra HAM secara utuh (sipil, politik, ekonomi, sosial, budaya), potret demokrasi Indonesia tidak terlalu jelek, tetapi juga belum terlalu bagus. Dari 237 juta orang Indonesia, hanya sekitar 45- 50 juta “kelas menengah Indonesia” yang hidup layak dalam arti memiliki hunian layak untuk manusia, akses pada layanan publik yang memadai, cukup sandang pangan, serta terjangkau listrik dan air minum.Kelas
menengah Indonesia ini pendapatannya sekitar USD3.000- 7.500 setahun. Umumnya orang profesional atau semiprofesional di kota-kota besar (Jakarta, Surabaya,Medan,Makassar, Semarang,Palembang, dan sebagian kota madya yang memiliki infrastruktur yang memadai).

Dalam pertemuan Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu II dan para gubernur se-Indonesia pada April 2010, Presiden SBY menekankan pentingnya kebangkitan kelas menengah Indonesia untuk ”memajukan kualitas demokrasi Indonesia.” Kelas menengah Indonesia ini adalah andalan memajukan hak sipil, politik, ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya secara utuh dan tak terpisahkan. Mereka kini diandalkan sebagai motor penggerak Indonesia yang lebih adil dan sejahtera dari Sabang sampai Merauke.

Kelas menengah yang 45-50 juta inilah yang menjadi sasaran bidik industri media massa hiburan, televisi,dan aneka ragam “talkshow”. Mereka orang-orang mapan yang naik ke dunia gemerlap “di atas garis kenikmatan”.

Mereka harus diingatkan untuk memperkuat konsolidasi demokrasi Indonesia ke bawah dengan mengurangi ketimpangan ekonomi,menutup celah sosial dan budaya yang masih mencengkam lebih dari separuh penduduk Indonesia, termasuk 57 juta kelompok usia 15-35 tahun yang rentan kerawanan sosial politik. Kelas menengah Indonesia ini harus menghindar diri dari “perangkap negara menengah” di mana anggota masyarakat yang telah naik ke kelas menengah menjadi puas diri dan tidak peduli pada mereka yang masih tertinggal.

Dan kelas menengah Indonesia harus berlomba untuk lebih baik daripada kelas menengah India,China,Brasil,bahkan kelas menengah AS sekalipun. Jika berhasil, barulah kita pantas menyatakan diri sebagai negara demokrasi yang berkualitas.

My Keynote Remarks at the Joint Symposium on ASEAN Peacebuilding organized by Paramadina University and Harvard University at Paramadina University, Jakarta.

I congratulate Paramadina University and Harvard University for jointly organizing this timely symposium. It is fitting that we gather in this symposium on peace-building December 10 on the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For when we talk about post-conflict resolution and peace-building we must ultimately talk about human rights in all of its five dimensions: civil, political, economic, social and cultural. As the United Nations Human Rights Summit in Vienna in June 1993 aptly stipulates, those five dimensions must be integrated, inseparable and proportional in their implementation in all countries, regions and continents throughout the world. While acknowledging the universality of the Declaration, the Vienna Summit also recognized the imperative to take into consideration the “ region specific” as well as the “historical and cultural context” of human rights in each country. After all, the true meaning of human rights__and indeed of peace and justice__can only have relevance within a particular ground level national and cultural context.

Well before Indonesia proclaimed independence in August 1945, our founding fathers had for months debated the basis of state identity of the projected Indonesia nation. Although the Indonesian nation then, as now, had the largest number of Muslims in any single country, our founding fathers affirmed in Pancasila as our state identity, incorporating a sublime blend of all the major religions, beliefs and secular norms prevalent in our diverse cultures. This agreement on fundamentals was pioneered and had been fought for politically, diplomatically as well as militarily by Indonesians of all creeds, races, ethnic group and provincial origin. Our founding fathers decided that the unitary state of Indonesia should uphold and respect the rich diversity and mutual tolerance of all of the nation’s living religious, cultural, ethnic as well as racial heritages. A healthy sense of modern nationalism triumphed over narrow primordial loyalties.

Pancasila___Believe in God, Humanitarianism, Nationalism, Democracy through Deliberation and Social Justice__became our agreed basis of what constitutes Indonesian-ness. Pancasila defined the platform of our “peace charter” binding Achenese in the west and Papuans in the east, committing North Sulawesi citizens with the peoples in the island of Rote. We remain today the world’s largest Muslim majority country, but by deliberate consensual choice not an Islamic state. In the course of our post-independence period, this belief in the mystical and mythical quality of Indonesian unity and cohesion based on our interpretation of “unity in diversity” was adhered to by the vast majority of our social and political leaders, Muslim as well as non-Muslim. But like all charters, pledges and political symbolism, Pancasila as a nation-wide commitment can only endure if its underpinnings is supported by a robust and balanced fulfillment of all five dimensions of human rights__ civil liberties, political freedom , economic sustenance , social cohesion and cultural resilience . This is the only way we can replenished a greater sense of Indonesian-ness from generation to generation.

Most people advocating tolerance and diversity do so because by they enjoy civil and political liberties precisely and because their economic, social and cultural needs have been adequately met. It is a truism to say that “Where you stand depends on where you sit; where you sit depends on what you eat; what you eat depends on where you where born.” One defends the rule of law because one’s particular station in life has made it convenient and expedient to be “part of the system” and one’s economic, social and cultural foundations are already sound and secure.

Over the past 10 years, various Indonesian administrations have sought to strengthen our sense of political, economic and cultural cohesion stronger and more resilient by addressing several priority issues.

President S.B. Yudhoyono identified good governance as one of the key priorities in peace-building at all levels: national, provincial, local. Over the past 5 years, in regions afflicted by political, communal, sectarian and ethnic violence__Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Ambon and Papua___the Ministry of Defense (Dephan) and the Indonesian Defense Force (TNI) are fully committed to support graduated political democratization towards greater competence and capacity building in civilian government, including ground-level post-conflict resolution and peace-building.

The TNI’s role has shifted from leading and dominating to measured presence in support of building the five pillars of democratic governance: civil society, political parties, the police, the prosecutors office and the courts system. Community policing is supported by the TNI’s measured Territorial Capacity Building. Every governor, district and sub-district officer in all of our 33 provinces and 493 second-tier governmental bureaucracy recognize the need to emulate the code of the military profession. Provincial, district and sub-district bureaucracies are expected to adopt similar rotational schemes which are all-important for fostering national administrative capacity-building, as well as for effective managerial capacity down to the village level. Additionally, the TNI is tacitly assigned to help accelerate sustainable economic growth. Not merely growth with equity, but more critically growth through equity. Measured military presence at each level of economic growth help define the rate of governmental capacity building at all level: national, provincial and local.

Every generation of Indonesia’s soldiers and officers is involved in a constant process of day-to-day “nation-building” and “nation-replenishing.” From Aceh to Papua, Army soldiers teach grade school arithmetic, help build bridges, rehabilitate villages and irrigation canals, provide rudimentary health care. Navy sailors and marines provide crucial logistical support to remote or isolated islands. Air Force personnel fly and distribute emergency relief to post-conflict areas and to victims of natural disasters. Each deed reinforces the locals’ sense of being cared for and participating in a more vibrant nation-wide common endeavor. Where thresholds of tolerance regarding what constitutes equity and fairness can be tenuous and fickle, more often than not it is the local soldier who acts as the credible “cultural broker.” This is the enduring task of being a people’s defense force. We firmly believe that in the final analysis,. social justice is a nation’s best defense.

Muslims in Indonesia co-exists and are enriched by day-to-day interaction with the practices, rituals and symbols of fellow citizens other faiths and beliefs: Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. “Indonesian-ness” is not based on a single majority ethnic group such as the Javanese. Nor is it based on a dominant “cultural heritage” like Malay identity, though some parts of western Indonesia find affinity with Malay culture. And in the eastern half of our country there are more Melanesians than in all of Melanesia proper.

Military presence and democratic governance are directly linked to narrowing the vertical “rich-poor gap”, as well as the western-eastern horizontal disparities in our archipelago. Differentiated rates of access to new knowledge and skills may endanger our nation’s sense unity and cohesion. Measured political development and successful political democratization cannot be sustainable without broad-based economic democratization. Both political and economic democratization cannot succeed without constant cultural replenishing of being Indonesian at ground-level. In addressing domestic and international terrorism, interdicting financial networks and disrupting their organizational capacity, the arrest and prosecution of suspected perpetrators must be conducted on the terms of Indonesian authorities and under the provisions of our legal system. Discreet and timely foreign security assistance rendered “on tap” are much more legitimate and effective than aid provided through virulent “on top” pressure from abroad.

Ultimately, violent extremism can only be overcome by concerted efforts to reduce inequities in development, reduce corruption and accelerate programs in poverty reduction. The police, the prosecutors office and the courts system can only do so much in addressing issues related to our young citizens who out of desperation and destitute find salvation in misguided religious martyrdom through violent behavior. Local religious, social and youth leaders can and must do their part. We are working hard to reduce these grievances so that the poor will not have to take their own lives because they have nothing to lose. We have to persuade them that a far greater mission in life is not to dare to die, but to have the audacity to live and work hard towards a better future.

I have been asked to address the issue of the topic presented at the launch of the Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilizations: Clash of Civilizations: Real or Imagined? I have come to the conclusion that the clash is both real as well as imagined, simply because “facts” or reality are often inseparable from perceptions “imagined”. The more so because much of the debate has been exacerbated and distorted through media.

Western media have used such variants of expressions ranging from “Islamic fundamentalism”, “Islamic terrorism”, “Islamic Jihadists”, and even “Islamic Fascists”. Toxic television, rabble ras well as trash tabloids are prone to use these caricatures. They feed on one another in ways “fact” becomes fiction, and fiction “ ignites” facts.

The Muslim world as a whole has suffered from this massive media manipulation. It has given rise to many different set of perceptions about “clashes within civilizations,” including among Muslims in the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia. You can also say that it is a clash of ideas about civilizations across all continents.

The “Clash of Civilizations” was first publicly raised in 1993 in an article written in Foreign Affairs magazine by Professor Samuel Huntington , and it is useful to remind ourselves of the context of when and why the question of clash of civilizations was brought up at the time.

First, it appeared in the wake of the “victory” of liberal capitalism over communism symbolized by the unification of two Germanies in October and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December. Earlier, the January 1991 Gulf War over Kuwait added the sense of western triumphalism. American hegemonism was at its peak.

Second, the crises in the Middle East and the rise of militant Islamist movements against Western interests throughout the world in the mid 1980s began to be perceived in the West that “Radical Islam” would supplant Communism as the principal challenge for the world-wide ideological contest. Bombings against western interests in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Gulf region resulted in the rise of faith-based neo-conservatism in the United States.

Thereafter, the events of September 11, 2001 confirmed the notion in the West that there would be a world-wide contest between the liberal capitalist world led by the United States and the Islamic world led by Usamah Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda movement.

While there may be superficial truth about this world-wide contest for ideological supremacy, the fact of the matter is that there were even more serious clashes within civilizations, both in “the West” as well as in the “Muslim world”. Within the Western world, there began a series of political cleavages between Christian fundamentalists and progressive schools both in the Protestant as well as Catholic churches, in North America, Europe as well as in Latin America.

In the United States, the Christian right representing various church denominations became powerful in influencing both domestic and foreign policy debates. From prayer in schools, abortion, gay marriages, stem cell research, to preaching Christian civilization and feisting western-style “democracy” abroad, these self righteous views influenced the perception that the current American administration has been strong influenced by the right wing constituencies. In Europe, crises of identity among Muslims within each of the European democracies in part have been compounded by worries over illegal immigration.

Contrary to popular opinion both in the West and within the Muslim world itself, there began serious clashes about civilization in the Islamic world itself. While a tiny minority may have been attracted to the motion of a “world wide caliphate” imbued by Islamic values as propounded by Usamah Bin Laden, there have been different “realities ” at the ground level.

Serious differences of the interpretation of Islam in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia began to proliferate. Differing interpretations of the practical application of Muslim values are present in the Middle East among and within each Arab state, between Arab states and Iran, between the larger Middle East and Turkey, between Muslims in Pakistan and Muslims in India. And indeed, among Muslims within Malaysia, Indonesia.

Ultimately, it is the clash of local political interests that define conflict in the Middle East. Much of the root causes of these conflict rests on tribal rivalry and clan contests for access to status, group privilege, personal power or combination of the three. As we meet in this room tonight, the Palestine Authority is divided by factionalism between Fatah and Hamas which ironically, has little to do with Islamic values. In contemporary Iraq, violent clashes occur between Sunnis and Shites, as well as among Sunni parochial groups. And then there are thecriminals and thugs who profit from incessant chaos. The issue of anti-Americanism is marginal to all of these situations.

Historically, the Muslim world in the Middle East has been marginalised by the juxtaposition of three issues: one, the Palestine-Israel conflict going back to the early 20th century; two, the nexus of energy dependence and strategic military projection of the West going back to the 1930s; three, the conflicting claims by Islam, Christianity, and the Jewish religion over heritage of the holy sites in the region.

After decades of so many “Middle East peace processes” involving presidents, prime ministers, chancellors, kings, sultan, emirs, special envoys, rapporteurs and good offices, there has to date been no international initiative that has been able to sustain the painstaking tribal and clan accords that are imperative to make any progress viable. Thus far, all manner of agreements have unravelled by these micro dimensions of clashes of civilization.

Indonesia has often been seen as a model “moderate” Muslim country which can play a significant contributing role to the peace process in the Middle East. But we all realise that the realities of the Muslim world in the Middle East is strikingly different from the situation in Southeast Asia. We must not be too tempted to preach, much less transpose, our version of Islam to the situation in the Arab world in particular and to the Middle East in general. The history, geography, culture and the regional strategic context of the Middle east and Southeast Asia are vastly too different to have any immediate practical relevance.

Within Indonesia itself, there is much work to be done in the days, months and years ahead to prevent and mitigate clashes within our own micro civilizations at the ground level. From Aceh to Papua, from Northen Sulawesi to the south in Rote, the challenges of alleviating mass poverty needs to be addressed in tandem with continuing cooperation and dialogue among Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists and Confucians.

The effective delivery of food, adequate housing, clean water, primary health care, affordable utilities and employment to the 39 million who live off on less than 2 dollars a day and the 10 million openly jobless are sources of profound challenges to all Muslim leaders of the Muhammadiyah, the NU, and all Islam-based parties and civic groups represented in this hall.

For myself, it is a source of pride and hope that many of you who recently established this Centre have worked together with friends and colleagues from other faiths to rebuild schools, mosques, churches, and health care facilities after the many devastating social conflicts throughout Indonesia over the past 9 years.

While we may enjoy and enrich ourselves intellectually in gatherings of seminars, workshops and even in launch events such as here, we can only pre-empt clashes among our religious communities if we together cooperate in providing basic human needs to the poorest members of each of our constituents.

As we all work hard towards a fairer and just society, let us through the work of this Centre enhance our sense of tolerance among our faiths by appreciating the salient features of our respective religious precepts, rituals and norms. Let us commit ourselves to ensuring that many, if not all, of those whom we seek to alleviate from wrenching poverty can at least have the audacity of hope that their lives can improve within their life-time.

Realistically, we cannot in the near term save them all. There will be many who will have to go through a series of glitches and crashing of cultural gears, before things get better. But let us in this hall tonight pledge ourselves to resolving these ground-level issues as quickly as is humanely possible.

Only then can we be vindicated by our common commitment that this Centre is serious not only in promoting dialogue and cooperation among Indonesians of all faiths, but can provide real- world practical solutions on the ground that replenishes the true traditions of pluralism, tolerance and openness within the widening embrace of Indonesian-ness . Let us conduct dialogue and work cooperatively. Let us all practice what we preach.

Democracy is fine for those whose basic human needs (food, shelter, clothing, access to electricity, clean water, education) have been met. But for a large number of Indonesian (39 million living on less than 2 dollars per day; 10 million openly unemployed; 15 million families having to receive direct cash transfers) democracy has little personal meaning. The biggest challenge for President Yudhoyono is to attack mass poverty, overcome inequities in development and combat corruption. Radical groups, be they be religious or secular based, pose a threat to Indonesia’s democracy.

But hope remains that within the next 3 years the threat of radical and violent extremism can be mitigated and that as democracy is underpinned by broad based social-economic development, Indonesia’s democracy can be salvaged and made sustainable. The following new analysis from a recent Reuters report sheds light on the socal-economic dimensions of Indonesia’s democracy.

Poverty May Disrupt Indonesia’s Young Democracy. By Gde Anugrah Arka – Analysis.

Failure to cope with poverty and unemployment could strengthen radical movements in Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country, threatening its young democracy and path toward economic liberalism, analysts say. Indonesia’s poverty rate is among Asia’s worst, and looks set to remain grim for the foreseeable future on high unemployment and lack of strong political ability to tackle the issues.

Adding to the problem, Southeast Asia’s biggest economy continues to shift to less labour-intensive sectors. The chronic poverty raises concerns about continued success for Indonesia’s seven-year effort at democracy, the first since a failed attempt in the 1950s. Many analysts say so far that effort has been impressive. “Indonesia is now, arguably, the most democratic nation in Southeast Asia,” said Ken Conboy, a security consultant in Jakarta who closely monitors radical groups.

Thailand has just undergone a military coup, Vietnam and Laos are one-party states, Myanmar is run by a junta, and most other countries in the region have policies that rights groups say leave their democracies flawed. However, democracy alone may not be enough to keep Indonesians content. “Economic problems definitely play into the hands of religious and political extremists. Extremists had a far more difficult time making inroads in Indonesia when the economy was booming.”

Poverty by itself does not necessarily endanger democracy. But if it combines with radical ideologies that reject the current secular political system in the world’s most populous Muslim country, Indonesia’s democratic transition may be disrupted, analysts say. “People get more and more desperate, and ideas and solutions they used to reject begin to sound more acceptable. This is already happening in Indonesia and a point will be reached when it cannot be reversed,” said political and economic professor Jeffrey Winters of Northwestern University in the United States, who has followed Indonesia for many years.

That could be a matter of concern not just for those who see democracy as most likely to protect human rights, but for countries worried about Indonesia serving as a base for spreading militancy in the region, and its strategic position along the Malacca Strait waterway, one of the world’s busiest. Indonesia’s latest poverty data, ending in March 2006 , showed that as of that month there was an increase of 11 percent since February 2005 due in part to fuel subsidy cuts in the budget that pushed up consumer prices. The number of Indonesians below Indonesia’s poverty line of about 80 U.S. cents-per-day hit around 39 million in March, almost one fifth of the population.

That could provide grist for the emergence of a strong political left as has recently happened in Latin America, and for militant religious movements. “As more and more people get unemployed and fall into poverty, demand for changes including socialism such as in Latin America are likely to grow,”said economist Helmi Arman of brokerage Bahana Sekuritas.

In the religious area Indonesia has already seen a series of deadly bombings in recent years, some carried out by Islamic militants mostly raised in poor villages. “How do radicals attempt to exploit the situation? In some cases, they offer a utopian, non-secular vision of prosperity and piety. For the under-educated, such promises hold appeal,” says Conboy.

“Religious radicalism can be a major threat to democracy; by definition, non-secular extremism undercuts tolerance,” he said. There has been increasing demand for a shift from Indonesia’s secular traditions, with some regions implementing Islamic laws such as mandatory headscarves for Muslim women, and calls for greater media censorship. In the province of Aceh caning for violations of religious rules has been imposed.

Despite chronic poverty and an official unemployment rate hovering around 10 percent as of 2006, among the highest in Asia, with another 30 percent considered underemployed, some in the country’s political elite have given low priority to the issues.

The nascent state of democracy and masses accustomed to following authority have thus far left room for politicians to escape accountability, but analysts say that situation cannot persist indefinitely. “Indonesia has both components. It has a suffering and frustrated population plus extremist movements eager to organise the people’s anger into a force that can fundamentally change the kind of country it has been since independence,” Winters said.

[But defense minister Juwono Sudarsono, who overseas a military committed to constitutional democracy and pluralism, is more optimistic. “We have in Yudhoyono a president whose personal integrity is impeccable and who is totally committed to attack mass poverty, inequities in development and corruption,” he says. “For all of the social unrest, economic challenges and natural disasters that he has faced in the past 22 months, Yudhoyono is essentially still seen as a force for good and of decency.”

A recent poll suggests that Yudhoyono is still trusted by 67 percent of the despondent and desperate who remain hopeful that things can and will improve under his leadership. “He is determined to ensure that democracy is socially and economically more accessible to those who have yet to be lifted from abject poverty” says Sudarsono. “That in itself will reduce the appeal of radical ideologies, be they be religious or secular-based .”] (adapted from Reuters).

Stanley Weiss is reknowed business consultant who travels widely in Asia. He is a proponent of Indonesian democracy and is fond of Bali. His message in this article is that a tolerant and pluralistic Indonesia is possible so long as political and economic empowerment reaches to the majority of the Muslim poor.

Click the Continue Reading button or you can also read the full article at the International Herald Tribune

Indonesia: Why Pluralism will Prevail .
By Stanley Weiss. Business Executive for National Strategy.

You could be forgiven for thinking that Indonesia, long admired as a beacon of Muslim moderation, is descending into an Islamic theocracy.

Christian churches are torched. Western resorts, hotels and embassies are bombed. Abu Bakar Bashir, the radical cleric imprisoned for inspiring the Bali bombings of 2002, receives a hero’s welcome home from fellow jihadists.

Across the country, more than two dozen cities and districts have imposed variations of Shariah, Islamic law, requiring women to wear headscarves and banning alcohol, gambling and adultery.

But a visit with Dr. Zulkieflimansyah (who, like many Indonesians, uses one name and is more commonly known as Zul) reveals the more complex face of political Islam here.

As vice chairman of the Justice and Prosperity Party, a rapidly- growing Islamic party with two cabinet ministers, Zul speaks of the need for an “Islamic moral code” in a country that is more than 80 percent Muslim.

But the 34-year-old British-trained economist equivocates when I ask if his party will push for Shariah: “This is difficult. If we say no, we will be rejected by the Muslims. If we say yes, there are too many definitions of Shariah.”

So Zul, now a gubernatorial candidate whose running mate is a well-known actress-turned-politician, speaks of fighting corruption and poverty and creating jobs and investment. “All this can be considered Shariah,” he says. “We are not trying to create a new society like the Arabs. Pluralism is a fact of life, and radical Islam is our enemy.”

Zul’s deft balancing act mirrors that of Indonesia – the country with the world’s largest Muslim population but which, as a state, is officially neither secular nor Islamic.

After proclaiming independence in 1945, attempts to forge an Islamic state were thwarted when nationalists removed from the new constitution the famous “seven words” – “with obligation for Muslims to practice Shariah.”

Instead, the official ideology of Pancasila – “five pillars”: belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy and social justice – was a quintessentially Indonesian compromise, acknowledging the role of religion in public life while guaranteeing the freedom of six state-recognized faiths: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism.

Ever since, attempts to create an Islamic state or impose Shariah nationally, whether by bullet or ballot, have been soundly defeated. As recently as 2002, parliament overwhelmingly rejected amending the constitution to allow for Shariah.

Defeated nationally, Islamists have gone local, empowered by a decentralization movement allowing greater regional autonomy – most notably in conservative Aceh, where canings of Shariah offenders have drawn international condemnation.

But “Aceh does not represent Indonesia,” as an Australian diplomat told me. In a nation of 240 million people, Shariah in a few cities and districts is an aberration. In fact, there already are signs of a backlash against Shariah among Indonesian Muslims, who largely espouse a less rigid form of Islam that blends Hinduism, Buddhism and Javanese mysticism.

“Democracy can be noisy,” Vice President Jusuf Kalla tells me, but in Indonesia “there are far more moderates than radicals.”

Indeed, a major poll last month showed that the vast majority of Indonesians reject Shariah and still embrace Pancasila. But in treating the symptoms of extremism, Jakarta must not ignore underlying causes.

With 40 million chronically unemployed and perhaps 100 million living in poverty, “we are running out of time,” says Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, who oversees a military that considers itself a guardian of constitutional pluralism.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, accused of being indecisive on the economic front, now appears to understand the urgency. Jakarta is alive with rumors that he plans a dramatic “October Surprise,” reshuffling his cabinet, with an eye toward a bold New Deal-style program to create jobs and combat poverty.

The murderous acts and militant agenda of a radical few here are making headlines. But historically, culturally, religiously and politically, Indonesians give hope that the center will hold – that they will succeed in what Sudarsono calls “the big challenge of daring young Muslims not to die for Islam, but to live for Islam.”

The Indonesian Parliament recently passed two landmark legislation . On July 11, the Aceh Governance Act was passed, after over 5 months of debate following the agreement between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) reached at Helsinki in August 2005. The agreement was brokered by the European Union and representatives from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). All credit to Interior Minister Muhammad Maaruf and his staff who tirelessly defended that the any provisions of the MOU with GAM must pass the litmus test of Indonesian sovereignty as provided in the Indonesian Constitution of 1945.

GAM had insisted, for example, that the Indonesian Defense Force (TNI), should exclusively deal with “external defense” and that only the Indonesian Police be assigned to internal security duties. This demand runs counter to article 30 of the Indonesian constitution which stipulates that all Indonesian citizens are obliged to participate in the “total defense and security” of the nation. Hence, the soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines of the TNI (and even civilians) have an important role to play in supporting police in internal security affairs.

The second bill, on Indonesian Citizenship, passed July 12 was hailed as a landmark in Indonesia’s legal history. All Indonesians, “irrespective of heritage of race, color, religion and country of birth” would be “guaranteed equal treatment under law”. The act provided assurance that Indonesian female spouses of foreign nationals, for example, retain their nationality and guaranteed fair and equal treatment. The Citizenship Act assured nationals of “foreign descent” (read: Indonesian of Chinese origin) that they would be protected from discriminative behavior.

Now comes the hard part: matching legal provisions with the realities on the ground. Or, more precisely, of getting realities on the ground match with the legal provisions enacted in both the Aceh Governance and the Citizenship laws.

Questions abound: Can the pro-republican Acehnese provide the political leadership and direction so that the majority of ex-GAM Acehnese who have returned to the fold feel that they would sincerely be accepted as citizens of the Indonesian republic? Will the republicans feel that they will also share benefits from the special economic programs provided by the Jakarta central government, the Aceh Recovery Agency and the multinational donor agency?

Passing legislation in parliament is an important legal step in supporting democracy and decentralized government. But acceptance and legitimacy of the two laws (or of any law for that matters) must be matched with the political, economic and realities on the ground. For the Aceh Governance Act, the real test is in providing equitable distribution of economic growth with special emphasis on employment. The more ex-GAM are integrated through employment schemes with republicans, the more the Governance Act will resound in the hearts and minds of all Acehnese. The hearts and minds programs must be supported by timely access to basic needs: water, housing, electricity, schools, health care, hospitals and employment. These are the realities that must be improved at the ground level to match the legal formulations

Likewise, the more that the disparity between rich and poor is significantly reduced, the more all Indonesian citizens will be united by their respective professions, skills and work. Rather than being divided by race, religion or primordial identity, the “Indonesian mosaic” will reflect the calls for national unity of the Citizenship Act.

All democratic nations profess to believe in the rule of law and the famous adage “equal justice under law.” But we all now that in all countries, that often some enjoy more justice than others because they “can afford the law.” For those who still have to struggle to make ends meet, legal provisions are beyond their ken. Our biggest challenge is to drastically improve the social-economic realities of decentralized government in Aceh and of citizenship for all Indonesians so that the soaring rhetoric of the law will be within their intellectual and material grasp. After all, any “rule of law” can have meaning only to those whose basic human needs have been adequately met.

It’s a measure of our times of political transition that the debate about Pancasila as state identity (dasar negara) continues even after President Yudhoyono’s reaffirmation of the precepts as the “fundamental basis of our national life” on June 1, 2006, at the 61st anniversary of the birth of Pancasila speech proclaimed by the late President Soekarno on June 1, 1945, a few months before Indonesia’s declaration of independence on August 17, 1945. President Yudhoyono emphasized the need to fulfill the basic consensus since 1945: Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, The Unitary State of Indonesia, Diversity in Unity.

Some Islamist groups had alarmed minority and non-Islamic communities with their fervent call for a stricter adherence to a more Islamic precept of social, economic and political life by pushing for an all-encompassing official restriction on “amoral and lewd” behavior, giving rise to fears that other communities will have to be subjected to legal norms contravening their respective personal and public code of conduct. Several regional governments have issued edicts applying shariah law for public behavior. The Ministry of Home Affairs is reviewing some of these edicts, which may directly contravene basic provisions of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945.

The Declaration on Indonesian-ness (Maklumat Ke-Indonesiaan) which was read in front of President Yudhoyono and cabinet ministers on the June 1, 2006, anniversary celebrations recently drew reaction from a member of the Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), who derided the petitioners of Indonesian-ness as being “overly fearful of Islam” and in danger of propounding “outright secularism nationalism.”

The fact of the matter is that Soekarno on June 1, 1945, affirmed that Indonesia’s state identity was not overly secular (as in India), nor was it strictly theocratic (as in Saudi Arabia). Soekarno had appealed to Islamic participants in the Preparatory Committee to Prepare Indonesian Independence to accept the fact that the Indonesian state was to be established based on “an agreement on fundamentals” by all ethnic, racial, provincial as well as religious groups across the former Netherlands Indies who had fought for founding the Indonesian Republic. Soekarno also emphasized that there is an enduring “mythical unity” in the consciousness of all Indonesians that pluralism was an important feature of “being Indonesian”. Nationalist, Islamist and all other beliefs and faiths would be united through a “sublime union of all Indonesians.”

Being an Indonesian Muslim, therefore, necessitates a wider and more tolerant _expression of one’s sense of being Indonesian with all its rich impulses arising from family, ethnicity, provincial identity, racial heritage and the “enrichment of Islam through understanding the beliefs and and precepts of other faiths.” Throughout Muslim Indonesia, therefore, there are diverse interpretations of precepts, of application and indeed of rituals among Javanese (Central and East Java) just as there would be variations among Sundanese, Minangkabau/Padang, Makassar and Bugis as indeed among Acehnese themselves. Likewise with Indonesian Protestantism (Batak Church, Baptist, Methodist) and significant though less pronounced variations of Catholicism, Budhism, Hinduism, as well as Confucianism. Eclectism and syncretism were the keys to healthy pluralism and mutual tolerance.

It is also important to remember that Indonesia, though the country with largest number of Muslims” is not “an Islamic state”, a distinction clearly made when Indonesia was accepted as a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference. (Indonesians take note of the fact that the OIC was never set up as an organization in which each state had implanted the Islamic faith as its sole basis of state identity).

In the event, the recent debates resurfaced on the question of emphasis. Non-Muslims and minority groups adherence to the “plurality and tolerant values” is seen as affirming the need to remind Islamist groups of the origins of Indonesian identity; Islamist groups, on the other hand, perceive increase of “market globalization, secularization and loss of moral values” as encroachments on their notion of ” the central message of Islam, which is social justice ” for the vast majority who remain poor and desperate” and to which Islam “provide outreach and solace.”

Doubtless the debates on these issues will be discussed in the upcoming International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS) in Jakarta, June 20-21, which will be officially opened by President Yudhoyono at the Jakarta Convention Center. My own feeling is that the rehashing of philosophical and values debates urgently need to be followed on by something more tangible on the ground. Inter-faith dialogues, including matters relating to “Islam-West relations”, have had considerable play in many forums across the Middle East, North America, Europe and Asia.

How about following up these dialogue forums with “projects on inter-faith employment” funded jointly by Islamic and Western multilateral aid agencies and donor governments. After all, when all the debates and discussions are said and done, what young people especially poor Muslims across the developing world__ really need are jobs, jobs, jobs. Jobs will to retain their sense of identity and regain their dignity. Employment will readily reduce their sense of humiliation and enhance their sense of individual self-worth.