It also faces the problem of urban rural drive, exacerbated by issues like Tibet, Xinjiang and the hinterland away from China’s eastern seaboard. In short, domestic performance counts. It will take another generation before China becomes a truly comprehensive power. Until then, it very much remains a regional power.

Setiap akhir tahun berbagai kalangan di dunia menerbitkan survei kemajuan demokrasi di beberapa negara maju maupun negara berkembang.

Masing-masing survei membuat kajian berdasarkan selera ukuran dan indikator masing-masing.Ada yang mengedepankan “keterbukaan politik” seperti kemerdekaan pers, kebebasan berserikat, penghormatan pada golongan minoritas (suku, agama, dan ras). Ada juga yang mendasarkan pada besaran “golongan menengah” masingmasing negara. Survei bisnis dan ekonomi umumnya mengacu pada kemampuan pengelolaan utang publik maupun utang swasta serta kemampuan pengendalian fiskal negara.

Indonesia telah lama disebut sebagai “negara demokrasi terbesar ketiga”, setelah India dan Amerika Serikat, sedikitnya menurut hasil Bali Democracy Forum yang diselenggarakan 9-10 Desember 2010.Namun,beberapa kalangan mempertanyakan tolok ukur yang dipakai untuk pemeringkatan seperti itu.

Terutama kalangan aktivis yang menekankan pentingnya demokrasi ekonomi,sosial,dan budaya sebagai sandaran matra demokrasi dalam arti luas. Karena tolok ukur yang berbeda, muncul berbagai interpretasi tentang makna keberhasilan demokrasi di negara-negara seperti India, China,Brasil,dan Indonesia.

Kalau ditinjau dari tolok ukur hak asasi manusia (HAM) dalam lima matra yang utuh (kebebasan sipil, politik, ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya), tidak ada negara maju maupun berkembang yang sempurna menjalankan demokrasi. Di India dan China, misalnya, yang masing-masing berpenduduk 1,1 dan 1,3 miliar manusia,hanya 300-350 juta orang yang memenuhi tolok ukur HAM secara utuh.

Jumlah orang India yang mampu secara ekonomi dan sosial menikmati “demokrasi ” hanyalah 300 juta yang menduduki “kelas menengah” India dengan pendapatan per kapita antara USD3.000-6.000 per tahun. Selebihnya, sekitar 700 juta manusia, belum terjangkau hak ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya.

India pemeringkat pertama demokrasi dunia kalau diukur hanya dari 2 matra HAM,yaitu kebebasan sipil dan kebebasan politik.Dari segi hak ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya, lebih dari 700 orang India terjerat dalam kenistaan yang menyedihkan.Demokrasi “gaya Westminster” tidak bersendikan keadilan dan kewajaran sosial, ekonomi, dan budaya.

“Kelas menengah” di China juga hanya berkisar 300- 350 juta orang yang sudah menikmati “kenaikan kelas” ekonomi selama 30 tahun kemajuan pesat China sejak 1979. Tetapi, rakyat China yang di pedalaman dan hidup jauh dari pusat-pusat ekonomi China di sepanjang kota-kota pantai selatan masih bergelut dengan perusakan lingkungan, penurunan kesehatan,dan kemiskinan yang amat mencengkam. Mukjizat“Konsensus Beijing” tidak bersendikan lima matra HAM yang utuh.

Mukjizat Brasil yang kerap dipuja- puja kalangan media negara maju juga tidak kalah memprihatinkan. Ketimpangan ekonomi antara kaya dan miskin,antara kota industri dan hutan di pedalaman, pembunuhan terhadap kaum miskin kota.

Di sejumlah negara Eropa Barat sekarang sedang dikaji sampai di mana demokrasi Inggris, Prancis, Jerman, dan Italia bisa luput dari menjeratnya utang negara yang dialami Yunani, Spanyol, dan Irlandia.Pengelolaan uang negara jadi ukuran penting demokrasi yang sejati karena jaminan sosial ekonomi dari negara terancam beban pengetatan fiskal.

Di Amerika Serikat (AS), jawara demokrasi negara paling kaya di dunia,utang negaranya bahkan sudah mencapai 66% dari pendapat domestik bruto. Dana talangan pemerintah sebesar USD850 miliar lebih dipakai dan dinikmati oleh 13 bank swasta terbesar yang asetnya mencapai USD10,5 triliun.

AS mungkin demokrasi politik kedua terbesar di dunia; tetapi AS adalah suatu oligarki perbankan/keuangan di Wall Street, yang juga menguasai komisi-komisi ekonomi dan keuangan di DPR dan Senat AS. Reformasi layanan kesehatan untuk 30 juta orang AS tersendat oleh DPR dan Senat Amerika yang dikuasai lobi-lobi industri obat dan kesehatan yang amat kuat.

Terlepas dari debat demokrasi politik dan demokrasi ekonomi mancanegara, bagaimana demokrasi Indonesia? Jika ditinjau dari segi lima matra HAM secara utuh (sipil, politik, ekonomi, sosial, budaya), potret demokrasi Indonesia tidak terlalu jelek, tetapi juga belum terlalu bagus. Dari 237 juta orang Indonesia, hanya sekitar 45- 50 juta “kelas menengah Indonesia” yang hidup layak dalam arti memiliki hunian layak untuk manusia, akses pada layanan publik yang memadai, cukup sandang pangan, serta terjangkau listrik dan air minum.Kelas
menengah Indonesia ini pendapatannya sekitar USD3.000- 7.500 setahun. Umumnya orang profesional atau semiprofesional di kota-kota besar (Jakarta, Surabaya,Medan,Makassar, Semarang,Palembang, dan sebagian kota madya yang memiliki infrastruktur yang memadai).

Dalam pertemuan Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu II dan para gubernur se-Indonesia pada April 2010, Presiden SBY menekankan pentingnya kebangkitan kelas menengah Indonesia untuk ”memajukan kualitas demokrasi Indonesia.” Kelas menengah Indonesia ini adalah andalan memajukan hak sipil, politik, ekonomi, sosial, dan budaya secara utuh dan tak terpisahkan. Mereka kini diandalkan sebagai motor penggerak Indonesia yang lebih adil dan sejahtera dari Sabang sampai Merauke.

Kelas menengah yang 45-50 juta inilah yang menjadi sasaran bidik industri media massa hiburan, televisi,dan aneka ragam “talkshow”. Mereka orang-orang mapan yang naik ke dunia gemerlap “di atas garis kenikmatan”.

Mereka harus diingatkan untuk memperkuat konsolidasi demokrasi Indonesia ke bawah dengan mengurangi ketimpangan ekonomi,menutup celah sosial dan budaya yang masih mencengkam lebih dari separuh penduduk Indonesia, termasuk 57 juta kelompok usia 15-35 tahun yang rentan kerawanan sosial politik. Kelas menengah Indonesia ini harus menghindar diri dari “perangkap negara menengah” di mana anggota masyarakat yang telah naik ke kelas menengah menjadi puas diri dan tidak peduli pada mereka yang masih tertinggal.

Dan kelas menengah Indonesia harus berlomba untuk lebih baik daripada kelas menengah India,China,Brasil,bahkan kelas menengah AS sekalipun. Jika berhasil, barulah kita pantas menyatakan diri sebagai negara demokrasi yang berkualitas.

My Keynote Remarks at the Joint Symposium on ASEAN Peacebuilding organized by Paramadina University and Harvard University at Paramadina University, Jakarta.

I congratulate Paramadina University and Harvard University for jointly organizing this timely symposium. It is fitting that we gather in this symposium on peace-building December 10 on the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For when we talk about post-conflict resolution and peace-building we must ultimately talk about human rights in all of its five dimensions: civil, political, economic, social and cultural. As the United Nations Human Rights Summit in Vienna in June 1993 aptly stipulates, those five dimensions must be integrated, inseparable and proportional in their implementation in all countries, regions and continents throughout the world. While acknowledging the universality of the Declaration, the Vienna Summit also recognized the imperative to take into consideration the “ region specific” as well as the “historical and cultural context” of human rights in each country. After all, the true meaning of human rights__and indeed of peace and justice__can only have relevance within a particular ground level national and cultural context.

Well before Indonesia proclaimed independence in August 1945, our founding fathers had for months debated the basis of state identity of the projected Indonesia nation. Although the Indonesian nation then, as now, had the largest number of Muslims in any single country, our founding fathers affirmed in Pancasila as our state identity, incorporating a sublime blend of all the major religions, beliefs and secular norms prevalent in our diverse cultures. This agreement on fundamentals was pioneered and had been fought for politically, diplomatically as well as militarily by Indonesians of all creeds, races, ethnic group and provincial origin. Our founding fathers decided that the unitary state of Indonesia should uphold and respect the rich diversity and mutual tolerance of all of the nation’s living religious, cultural, ethnic as well as racial heritages. A healthy sense of modern nationalism triumphed over narrow primordial loyalties.

Pancasila___Believe in God, Humanitarianism, Nationalism, Democracy through Deliberation and Social Justice__became our agreed basis of what constitutes Indonesian-ness. Pancasila defined the platform of our “peace charter” binding Achenese in the west and Papuans in the east, committing North Sulawesi citizens with the peoples in the island of Rote. We remain today the world’s largest Muslim majority country, but by deliberate consensual choice not an Islamic state. In the course of our post-independence period, this belief in the mystical and mythical quality of Indonesian unity and cohesion based on our interpretation of “unity in diversity” was adhered to by the vast majority of our social and political leaders, Muslim as well as non-Muslim. But like all charters, pledges and political symbolism, Pancasila as a nation-wide commitment can only endure if its underpinnings is supported by a robust and balanced fulfillment of all five dimensions of human rights__ civil liberties, political freedom , economic sustenance , social cohesion and cultural resilience . This is the only way we can replenished a greater sense of Indonesian-ness from generation to generation.

Most people advocating tolerance and diversity do so because by they enjoy civil and political liberties precisely and because their economic, social and cultural needs have been adequately met. It is a truism to say that “Where you stand depends on where you sit; where you sit depends on what you eat; what you eat depends on where you where born.” One defends the rule of law because one’s particular station in life has made it convenient and expedient to be “part of the system” and one’s economic, social and cultural foundations are already sound and secure.

Over the past 10 years, various Indonesian administrations have sought to strengthen our sense of political, economic and cultural cohesion stronger and more resilient by addressing several priority issues.

President S.B. Yudhoyono identified good governance as one of the key priorities in peace-building at all levels: national, provincial, local. Over the past 5 years, in regions afflicted by political, communal, sectarian and ethnic violence__Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Ambon and Papua___the Ministry of Defense (Dephan) and the Indonesian Defense Force (TNI) are fully committed to support graduated political democratization towards greater competence and capacity building in civilian government, including ground-level post-conflict resolution and peace-building.

The TNI’s role has shifted from leading and dominating to measured presence in support of building the five pillars of democratic governance: civil society, political parties, the police, the prosecutors office and the courts system. Community policing is supported by the TNI’s measured Territorial Capacity Building. Every governor, district and sub-district officer in all of our 33 provinces and 493 second-tier governmental bureaucracy recognize the need to emulate the code of the military profession. Provincial, district and sub-district bureaucracies are expected to adopt similar rotational schemes which are all-important for fostering national administrative capacity-building, as well as for effective managerial capacity down to the village level. Additionally, the TNI is tacitly assigned to help accelerate sustainable economic growth. Not merely growth with equity, but more critically growth through equity. Measured military presence at each level of economic growth help define the rate of governmental capacity building at all level: national, provincial and local.

Every generation of Indonesia’s soldiers and officers is involved in a constant process of day-to-day “nation-building” and “nation-replenishing.” From Aceh to Papua, Army soldiers teach grade school arithmetic, help build bridges, rehabilitate villages and irrigation canals, provide rudimentary health care. Navy sailors and marines provide crucial logistical support to remote or isolated islands. Air Force personnel fly and distribute emergency relief to post-conflict areas and to victims of natural disasters. Each deed reinforces the locals’ sense of being cared for and participating in a more vibrant nation-wide common endeavor. Where thresholds of tolerance regarding what constitutes equity and fairness can be tenuous and fickle, more often than not it is the local soldier who acts as the credible “cultural broker.” This is the enduring task of being a people’s defense force. We firmly believe that in the final analysis,. social justice is a nation’s best defense.

Muslims in Indonesia co-exists and are enriched by day-to-day interaction with the practices, rituals and symbols of fellow citizens other faiths and beliefs: Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. “Indonesian-ness” is not based on a single majority ethnic group such as the Javanese. Nor is it based on a dominant “cultural heritage” like Malay identity, though some parts of western Indonesia find affinity with Malay culture. And in the eastern half of our country there are more Melanesians than in all of Melanesia proper.

Military presence and democratic governance are directly linked to narrowing the vertical “rich-poor gap”, as well as the western-eastern horizontal disparities in our archipelago. Differentiated rates of access to new knowledge and skills may endanger our nation’s sense unity and cohesion. Measured political development and successful political democratization cannot be sustainable without broad-based economic democratization. Both political and economic democratization cannot succeed without constant cultural replenishing of being Indonesian at ground-level. In addressing domestic and international terrorism, interdicting financial networks and disrupting their organizational capacity, the arrest and prosecution of suspected perpetrators must be conducted on the terms of Indonesian authorities and under the provisions of our legal system. Discreet and timely foreign security assistance rendered “on tap” are much more legitimate and effective than aid provided through virulent “on top” pressure from abroad.

Ultimately, violent extremism can only be overcome by concerted efforts to reduce inequities in development, reduce corruption and accelerate programs in poverty reduction. The police, the prosecutors office and the courts system can only do so much in addressing issues related to our young citizens who out of desperation and destitute find salvation in misguided religious martyrdom through violent behavior. Local religious, social and youth leaders can and must do their part. We are working hard to reduce these grievances so that the poor will not have to take their own lives because they have nothing to lose. We have to persuade them that a far greater mission in life is not to dare to die, but to have the audacity to live and work hard towards a better future.

The most pressing political-economic issue facing Indonesia is poverty reduction. The Department of Defense’s role in this regard is to provide support in enabling the government’s delivery system with regard to the numerous programs and projects administered or co-joined with various domestic and international agencies, both public as well as private.

Poverty in Indonesia, measured in income terms, affect 48% of Indonesia’s total population of 220 million. The government’s Medium Term Development Program (Rencana Jangka Menengah, RPJM) aims to reduce the poverty head count from 18.2 percent in 2004 to roughly 8.4 percent by 2009. When the plan was announced in the first cabinet meeting in late October 2004, no one foresaw the various domestic and international crises that would severely affect the trajectory of the poverty reduction programs.

Following the tsunami in late December 2004, there occurred earthquakes, mudflows, rice crises, the spike in international oil price rises and a host of residual social and ethnic conflicts throughout the archipelago arising from the crises of 7-8 years before. In addition, other natural and man-made disasters severely diverted the government’s resources to effectively alleviate poverty at the scope and speed that was originally targeted in late October 2004.

The World Bank’s Jakarta Office, in its outstanding report “Making the New Indonesia Work for The Poor” (November 2006) makes a clear case for the urgency that in addition to income-poverty, Indonesia still faces a long and difficult journey in pursuing programs to drastically reduce non-income poverty: malnutrition among a quarter of all children below the age of five; high maternal mortality rates (307 deaths in 100.00 births); education outcomes remain weak (among 16-18 year olds from the poorest quintile, only 55 percent completed junior high school (Sekolah Menengah Pertama, SMP); access to safe and clean water is slow (43 percent in rural areas, 78 percent in urban areas for the lowest quintile).

What do all these issues have to do with the Department of Defense and the Indonesian Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia,TNI)? The answer is starkly clear: plenty.

First, the Department of Defense and the TNI is committed to providing an effective and accountable delivery system in support of a still essentially weak civic governance and civil competence at all levels. Governmental capability __especially outside Java__still need the support of a carefully measured and calibrated role of the military in support of civic competence. Political crises, economic collapse and social unrest resulting from the financial crises in 1997-1998 led to incendiary violence among marginalised groups deprived of jobs, livelihood and of hope.

Throughout 1998-2003 overly drastic and immediate political openness in an environment of mass poverty, unemployment and fear of an uncertain future led to paroxysms of “the virility of violence” which gave rise to sectarian, ethnic and intra-regional enmity. The backlash against perceived heavy handedness of the military during the Soeharto years led to an exaggerated sense of “politically correct” but unrealistic notions of “democratic governance” among political parties, NGOs and other civic groups, all of whom remain too fragmented, too-disjointed and simply incompetent to provide ground-level work political stability.

Second, with respect to the TNI as a national force , as the people’s force, and as fighting defence force (tentara nasional, tentara rakyat, tentara kejuangan), the TNI has always been true to its commitment to assist those most deprived from access to basic human needs. The army, navy and air force has historically been engaged since the mid-1950s to initiate and support various people-centered projects at the ground level: building simple people’s housing, dams and irrigation channels; help set up affordable health care through the various medical units and battalions in villages, sub-districts, even at provincial level; non-coms have chipped in to stand in as teachers in Bahasa Indonesia and basic numeracy. In short, the TNI had preceded involvement in the very projects that the World Bank Jakarta Office Report focuses upon: non-income poverty, especially in the rural areas.

Finally, the Department of Defense and the TNI have pioneered policy and operational programs in attacking poverty as Indonesia’s version of the war on terror. Although poverty by itself do not correlated directly with acts of organized terrorism, the number of both income poor and non-income poor in Indonesia affects the our determination to wage war against the three main sources of terrorism world-wide.

First, inequities in development. With nearly half of our population living below the poverty line, there is urgent need to speed up programs that immediately mitigate disparities in income as well as distortions in access to basic human needs. Those who fall from the 2 dollar a day category to the 1,55 dollar a day category constitutes this margin of danger where young men or women disenfranchised economically may turn to desperate measures or attracted to radical ideologies.

Second, poverty eradication. As the people’s defense force, the TNI is obliged to be engaged in all government related poverty eradication schemes, to prove that the notion of a vigilant defense force can only credible if it true to its motion of caring and sharing with those who have yet to be lifted from abject poverty. Equally important, because the defense force realises that in the overall notion of defense in the wider sense, a just and equal society is the best defense.

Finally, anti-corruption. The Defense Department have completed a two-year program in transferring assets of all units of cooperatives, foundation and businesses to an inter-agency panel from the Departments of Defense, Finance, State Enterprises and Law & Human Rights.

A Presidential Decree establishing a National Agency to assess these assets and reconfigure all manners of “military businesses” is pending. Past military businesses have been identified with large-scale corruption abuses of human rights and pervasive repression. Having successfully pioneered an anti-corruption drive within is own house, the Department of Defense and the TNI have in fact deprived critics of the decades old ammunition of “an octopus-like” military-business complex.

Indonesia’s war on poverty and terrorism has along way to go. There will be glitches and crashing of social gears over the next ten to fifteen years. But the overall trajectory will remain on course and positive. There are even firmer grounds for optimism that Indonesia’s war against poverty will give substance to the notion: “Be tough against terrorism, but be tougher still against the sources of terrorism”. The Department of Defense has led the way.

Democracy is fine for those whose basic human needs (food, shelter, clothing, access to electricity, clean water, education) have been met. But for a large number of Indonesian (39 million living on less than 2 dollars per day; 10 million openly unemployed; 15 million families having to receive direct cash transfers) democracy has little personal meaning. The biggest challenge for President Yudhoyono is to attack mass poverty, overcome inequities in development and combat corruption. Radical groups, be they be religious or secular based, pose a threat to Indonesia’s democracy.

But hope remains that within the next 3 years the threat of radical and violent extremism can be mitigated and that as democracy is underpinned by broad based social-economic development, Indonesia’s democracy can be salvaged and made sustainable. The following new analysis from a recent Reuters report sheds light on the socal-economic dimensions of Indonesia’s democracy.

Poverty May Disrupt Indonesia’s Young Democracy. By Gde Anugrah Arka – Analysis.

Failure to cope with poverty and unemployment could strengthen radical movements in Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country, threatening its young democracy and path toward economic liberalism, analysts say. Indonesia’s poverty rate is among Asia’s worst, and looks set to remain grim for the foreseeable future on high unemployment and lack of strong political ability to tackle the issues.

Adding to the problem, Southeast Asia’s biggest economy continues to shift to less labour-intensive sectors. The chronic poverty raises concerns about continued success for Indonesia’s seven-year effort at democracy, the first since a failed attempt in the 1950s. Many analysts say so far that effort has been impressive. “Indonesia is now, arguably, the most democratic nation in Southeast Asia,” said Ken Conboy, a security consultant in Jakarta who closely monitors radical groups.

Thailand has just undergone a military coup, Vietnam and Laos are one-party states, Myanmar is run by a junta, and most other countries in the region have policies that rights groups say leave their democracies flawed. However, democracy alone may not be enough to keep Indonesians content. “Economic problems definitely play into the hands of religious and political extremists. Extremists had a far more difficult time making inroads in Indonesia when the economy was booming.”

Poverty by itself does not necessarily endanger democracy. But if it combines with radical ideologies that reject the current secular political system in the world’s most populous Muslim country, Indonesia’s democratic transition may be disrupted, analysts say. “People get more and more desperate, and ideas and solutions they used to reject begin to sound more acceptable. This is already happening in Indonesia and a point will be reached when it cannot be reversed,” said political and economic professor Jeffrey Winters of Northwestern University in the United States, who has followed Indonesia for many years.

That could be a matter of concern not just for those who see democracy as most likely to protect human rights, but for countries worried about Indonesia serving as a base for spreading militancy in the region, and its strategic position along the Malacca Strait waterway, one of the world’s busiest. Indonesia’s latest poverty data, ending in March 2006 , showed that as of that month there was an increase of 11 percent since February 2005 due in part to fuel subsidy cuts in the budget that pushed up consumer prices. The number of Indonesians below Indonesia’s poverty line of about 80 U.S. cents-per-day hit around 39 million in March, almost one fifth of the population.

That could provide grist for the emergence of a strong political left as has recently happened in Latin America, and for militant religious movements. “As more and more people get unemployed and fall into poverty, demand for changes including socialism such as in Latin America are likely to grow,”said economist Helmi Arman of brokerage Bahana Sekuritas.

In the religious area Indonesia has already seen a series of deadly bombings in recent years, some carried out by Islamic militants mostly raised in poor villages. “How do radicals attempt to exploit the situation? In some cases, they offer a utopian, non-secular vision of prosperity and piety. For the under-educated, such promises hold appeal,” says Conboy.

“Religious radicalism can be a major threat to democracy; by definition, non-secular extremism undercuts tolerance,” he said. There has been increasing demand for a shift from Indonesia’s secular traditions, with some regions implementing Islamic laws such as mandatory headscarves for Muslim women, and calls for greater media censorship. In the province of Aceh caning for violations of religious rules has been imposed.

Despite chronic poverty and an official unemployment rate hovering around 10 percent as of 2006, among the highest in Asia, with another 30 percent considered underemployed, some in the country’s political elite have given low priority to the issues.

The nascent state of democracy and masses accustomed to following authority have thus far left room for politicians to escape accountability, but analysts say that situation cannot persist indefinitely. “Indonesia has both components. It has a suffering and frustrated population plus extremist movements eager to organise the people’s anger into a force that can fundamentally change the kind of country it has been since independence,” Winters said.

[But defense minister Juwono Sudarsono, who overseas a military committed to constitutional democracy and pluralism, is more optimistic. “We have in Yudhoyono a president whose personal integrity is impeccable and who is totally committed to attack mass poverty, inequities in development and corruption,” he says. “For all of the social unrest, economic challenges and natural disasters that he has faced in the past 22 months, Yudhoyono is essentially still seen as a force for good and of decency.”

A recent poll suggests that Yudhoyono is still trusted by 67 percent of the despondent and desperate who remain hopeful that things can and will improve under his leadership. “He is determined to ensure that democracy is socially and economically more accessible to those who have yet to be lifted from abject poverty” says Sudarsono. “That in itself will reduce the appeal of radical ideologies, be they be religious or secular-based .”] (adapted from Reuters).

For the past eighteen months, the most talked about issue in Indonesian policy circles has centered on governance as the key solution to Indonesia’s economic recovery. Governance__both in officialdom, as well as in corporate as well as in civic society__was the key to stabilizing the economy as macro economic indicators began to improve: inflation was well under control, the government’s reserves peaked at $43 billion, economic growth rate at a respectable if not spectacular 5,4%, and there are plans to repay ahead of schedule the IMF $2.4 billion__about half of Indonesia’s outstanding debt.

Governance was the issue at all levels__national, provincial, local (regency, district) because the key problem since May 1998 was that as Indonesia was becoming democratic (at least for those who can afford it and whose basics needs are met) everyone recognized that democracy had to be substantiated by efficacy. The ability of the government, of private corporations and of all civic groups to make things happen and get things done rested on this single ability to energize government, corporations and advocacy groups.

Governance was the buzz word in all multilateral agency discussions. And it all depended on decisiveness and drive on the part of all government officials, from the top down to the lowest local unit. Both decisiveness and drive would ensure the most cherished dream among all government planners: the ability to deliver.

People talked about no democracy but substantial efficacy during Suharto’s time. Post May-1998, there was democracy aplenty, but little efficacy. Presidents Habibie, Wahid and Megawati, according to a former senior economics minister who served under Suharto, were just “passing through presidents”. Both Sukarno and Suharto, he said, were “real leaders who commanded authority and respect; whatever your opinion about their respective personal shortcomings, their personal authority made bureaucracy able to deliver.” He went on to warn, rather ominously, ” We cannot afford SBY to fail, and we must help him regain the ability to get his personal authority be felt within the myriad layers of the bureaucracy.”

The trick, of course is to balance the imperative to maintain of consensus-building through constant re-alignments within each faction in government (the vertical aspect of coordination and implementation) as well as in harnessing cross-departmental synergy (the much more difficult horizontal governmental inter-face). Getting things done may entail the need to be firm and___ when necessary___ authoritarian, if only temporarily. At some point, leaders at all levels must be able to occasionally show their sharper edges and be ruthless.

Governance and delivery will be the key issues in the run up to elections of 2009, particularly in the economic realm. With 36 million Indonesians living on less than two dollars a day, 10 million openly unemployed and 60 million needing direct cash transfers until the end of 2006, the “great ascent” for the next 18 months will be to aim for more efficacy, more governance and more delivery. In the perennial debate between democracy and efficacy, no perfection solution can be achieved. Indonesia is too diverse to govern efficiently.

But sixty percent success rate should be enough to halve the numbers of the poor, the unemployed and the desperate to enable them climb the social ladder, replenish their audacity of hope and reinforce governmental confidence to improve governance and deliver for the next set of challenges.

The fifteenth CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia) meeting was held June 14, 2006 at Bank Indonesia. About eigth cabinet ministers attended the opening session with lead speakers Dr Boediono, the Chief Economics Minister; Dr Sri Mulyani, the Finance Minister and Adm.Widodo, the Chief Security Minister. dr Andrew Steer. Country Director for Indonesia of the World Bank, presided over the sessions. Two publications, Investing for Growth and Recovery, prepared by the World Bank Jakarta Office, and Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment of the Yogyakarta and Central Java Natural Disaster , prepared by BAPPENAS the National Planning Agency, the Local Governments of Yogyakarta and Central Java and International partners (World Bank, Asian Development Bank) was issued to participants.

Overall, the reports by Boediono and Sri Mulyani on macro economic management was optimistic: the strengthening of the rupiah over the past 4 months, government budget deficit at 0.5 percent of GDP; debt to GDP ratio down to 47 percent; inflation planned at single digit throughout the next six months.

Donor representatives made their commitment speeches about continued assistance to Indonesia, but no major decision was made about assistance to Yogyakarta and Central Java. Press reports speak of USD 3 billion for Yogyakarta/Central Java, about the same figure for international assistance to India in 2001, and Pakistan in 2005, though lives lost in India and Pakistan were well above 50.000. The high figure is attributed to the need to rebuild of homes and buildings destroyed or heavily damaged, and the higher number of Indonesians wounded during the earthquake of May 27, 2006.

Everyone at the meeting agreed that governance was the central issue. Somehow, during the presentations I began to muse that beyond the talk about boxes, charts, figures, time lines and target dates, I felt that there was a bit too much of linear technocracy thinking. Discussions about road “maps” and “architecture” of the recovery process need to consider the more fundamental human and cultural factors.

In essence, we need more thinking about “horticulture” than “architecture”. However neat the plans on the drawing boards and however sophisticated the tools of development planning, it will be humans who will do the implementation on the ground. Team work and team spirit is more cultural than technocracy. Nurturing institutions require the appropriate implantation of seed, applying the right amount of water for plants and saps to grow, the right amount of sunlight to give light to nascent networks of cooperation among disparate groups. There will be hits and misses, and even social glitches and crashing of social gears along the way so long as 36 million Indonesians live below the poverty line, 10 million openly unemployed and 60 million receiving direct cash transfers until the end of 2006.

A strong dose of humility in development and recovery planning is needed by both donor agencies and Indonesian officials.