Overshadowed by the US-China rivalry over Asia-Pacific security primacy, Japan over the past few years has begun to quietly but firmly assert its security role in East Asia and the Pacific.

Its long-standing alliance with the United States and linkages to the US-Korea and the US-Taiwan security treaties network has given rise to its renewed security presence in East Asia, particularly given the uncertainty over reports regarding possible implications of the ongoing Chinese civilian and military elite relations over the role of the military in relation to politics and party leadership.

Japan’s recently published annual Defense White Paper cites “the worrying influence of the Chinese military in foreign policy issues over the disputed islands in the East China Sea” and “the need to reaffirm the presence of US forces stationed in Japan” against “regional contingencies” and “to bring a sense of security” to countries in the region.

The publication of the paper has received strong criticism from neighbors China and South Korea. While China has attacked the white paper for its gross “distortions”, jeopardizing Tokyo-Beijing relations and heightened tensions in the region, South Korea has issued an official reprimand, particularly regarding Japan’s reiterated claim to the Takeshima Islands, which are also claimed by Seoul under the name Dokdo.

The Japan-China dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has given rise to a perceptible nationalist surge in Japan, even as the Chinese military attempt to project its influence within the Chinese Party hierarchy, months before the expected leadership change within the Chinese Communist Party. Tensions are reported to be running high ahead of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, with the Chinese military’s desire to control the state’s military policy before the October 2012 congress — a forum held once in a decade to decide on party leadership change
at the top.

Meanwhile, Chinese defense ministry officials have tried to assure its domestic and foreign policy constituents that “protecting national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests will be closely coordinated with other departments in conscientiously discharging our responsibilities”.

In recognition that the civilian–military tussle has led to confusion among civilian and military leaders in Beijing, among command-level operational units in the PLA Navy and associated fisheries, as well as para-military forces in East China and South China Seas, the Japanese defense forces have been placed on high, though subdued alert.

Uncertainties regarding East Asia multilateral security policies is compounded by criticism in the United States that the “Asia pivot”, announced by the Obama administration in November 2011, has not resulted in a tangible manifestation that “60 percent of American forces will be deployed to the Asia-Pacific region”.

Several US congressmen and US think-thank analysts have pointed to the continued American deployment to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. All this is in conjunction with uncertainty as to how the retrenchment of the US$450 billion US defense budget over the next 10 years will affect the “rebalancing” of US forces to the Asia-Pacific region, including the US-Japan alliance
system.

Preparing for these uncertainties has added urgency for the Japanese defense forces to quietly but firmly raise its profile in its relations with both US and Chinese forces, which have for so long overshadowed Japan’s security profile in East Asia.

With 5 percent of the world’s population and still producing 25 percent of the world’s GDP, the US continues to dominate international standards in politics, diplomacy, economics, trade, finance and communications.

Even with the current burden of its deficits from the 2007-2008 financial crises, the US’ defense budget of US$650 billion remains greater than the combined defense budgets of Russia, China, India, Japan, Britain, France and seven advanced countries in Europe. Control of the global commons remains in the US’ strong hands.

Defense of the global commons has two dimensions: a strategic-military dimension; including cyberspace, nuclear, sea and air conventional forces and undersea capabilities, and the natural-environmental dimension; including water, natural resources, Arctic regions and climate change.

Like other dominant powers throughout history, the US has sought to prevail over management of the global commons within the context of its national interest, hence the scope and size of the US defense budget.

In 1992, Washington spent more than $450 billion on 700 American bases in North America, Europe, Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East, surpassing the defense expenditures of the next 12 major powers combined. From the Arctic to Northern Europe to the tropical waters of Oceania, the sun never set on the backs of American GIs.

Twenty years later, the United States is spending $650 billion to sustain America’s global leadership over the next decade, even as it phases out $450 billion in spending over the next 10 years.

Part of the reduction is related to addressing US deficits after more than 15 years benefitting from loans extended by Europe, China, Japan and South Korea. All of these countries enjoy the privileges of America’s security assurances. China implicitly acknowledges the need for the US’s “stabilizing presence” – despite its occasional defiant rhetoric and statements of its national interest in the Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait.

The rise of East Asian economies has led Washington into tricky negotiations and to forge new implicit understandings about the cost structure of safeguarding the regional commons regarding international trade, investments flows and political pre-eminence in East and Southeast Asia.

Both regions are subject to the area of responsibility of the US Pacific Command, whose essential role in cyberspace and nuclear and undersea capability remains both intact and unchallenged. The phased reduction of US defense expenditures may reduce America’s near hegemony, but credible alternatives to Russian, Chinese or Indian “spheres of influence” have yet to materialize.

While China enjoys a comprehesive strategic relationship with the US, China is well aware that its investments across the world are secured by US military forces. While US soldiers and marines secure Iraq and Afghanistan, Chinese oil and mineral companies have gained rights in Iraq’s northern region and to mine copper in Afghanistan. China’s access to Brazil’s “Chinamax” superport has guaranteed an adequate supply of iron ore for China’s burgeoning steel industry — yet it is the US Navy’s omnipresent 11 carrier strike groups worldwide that ensure China’s access to oil and strategic materials from Africa and that its worldwide exports to emerging economies are delivered on time.

While it takes two to three weeks for Chinese oil tankers to reach their ports from the Persian Gulf, it is US naval strike groups in the Indian and Pacific Ocean that secure strategic military commons. China may be keen to present the renminbi as alternative currency to the US dollar and the euro, but the risk of imported inflation by loosening its peg to the dollar will force China to consider the security costs of abruptly challenging America’s military primacy. In addition, America’s dominance in cyberspace security over international finance and banking transactions across Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tokyo, Seoul and Southeast Asian countries faces no serious challenge.

In the long run, US management of the strategic-military and the environmental commons will have to be rebalanced with the assistance of China, Russia, India, Japan and other growing economies and markets in East and Southeast Asia. For the moment, however, the terms for a more distributive control of the global commons will have to be patiently negotiated not only by the defense, finance, trade and environmental ministries but also by the chambers of commerces across the world.

The year-end trans-regional meetings of the G-20 in Nice, the APEC in Honolulu and the East Asian Summit in Bali serve to underscore the implications of the “stall speed” economies in North America and Europe to all other economies, businesses and governments throughout Asia, Latin America and Africa.

In the globally interconnected financial system, there are now more sober assessments about the economic trajectories of China, India, South Korea, Brazil, South Africa and other emerging markets. Political crises in the Middle East and civic unrest in Russia have grave implications over the viability of the euro and energy supplies from Europe to Central Asia.

The key question is: How will the global security environment impact the future of market access and economic stability within Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, China, Japan, South Korea and other economies in Latin America and Africa?

How will debates on retrenching the US defense budget over the next 10 years affect strategic assurances to the economies in mature as well as in emerging markets? Which power or combination of military powers can provide the all important security assurances that are vital to underpin economic recovery, deliver political stability and provide security assurances that markets anywhere ultimately rely on?

How will the global security environment evolve and how will regional security arrangements assure domestic market stability and predictability? The stability of debt restructuring in Europe depends on the security balance reached between the United States, NATO and Russia.

In East Asia, the terms and conditions of regional security depend on America’s commitment to the global commons and on China’s tacit acceptance of the preponderance of the US Navy for at least another 10 years. In Latin America and Africa, the American military presence helps assure regional economic and trade groupings, which offer timely financing to ensure sustainability in the war against drug and criminal gangs threatening nations’ social and cultural fabric.

The fulcrum of political-military “balance of power” and the evolving “power of balance” incorporating economic, financial, trade, investment and energy interaction traversing Europe, Central and the Middle East, Asia and Latin America will have to be factored in the overall rebalancing process.

As Russia, China and India develop greater military capabilities, can their desire to be preeminent in their respective “core areas of national interest” (Russia in Eastern Europe, China and India in Asia) be accommodated by American strategists increasingly aware of the need to share some degree of “strategic space” with Russia, China and India?

When the United States launched the 2008 Comprehensive Cyber Defense Capability, the stated goal was to ensure that US cyber security integrated federal, state government and private sector capabilities at all levels. It implied that US cyber defense covers military, business and finance sectors that serve to advance and protect the national security interest of the United States.

The lessons learned from cases of Russian and Chinese hacking into American systems in business and economic competitiveness have not been lost by influential business and political leaders.

More than ever, strategic linear planning must increasingly mesh with coordinated cyber capabilities. The subtle combination of “soft”, “smart” and “hard” powers has captured the imagination of leadership groups in government, in private business and in the military. Through this combination the US government and businesses can best connect, cooperate as well as compete across the world.

Increasingly, there is an urgent need to prepare more skilled and better-educated military officers able to interface not only with the planning of “military battles” over physical space, but also in areas of the “non-military battles” of ideas, of knowledge and of scientific skills, which are increasingly prominent in determining a nation’s ability to thrive in a “24/7” globalized world. Research in science and technology must continuously be prioritized to maintain America’s competitiveness against emerging market ascendancy.

In the US, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom, the curricula of “network centric warfare” emphasizes the need to interact and interface continuously to a broad community of military units, business schools and academia. That is the essence of “total defense” in applying information technology and the power of the Internet.

At the recent Bali meeting of higher military educational institutions from ASEAN and neighboring nations, there was common understanding that ASEAN countries should adopt a comprehensive vision integrating the global, the regional, the national, the provincial and the local so that “access to” and “claims over” strategic resources in their respective countries and in internationally disputed areas can be resolved through mediation and peaceful negotiation. “Sovereign space” between and among the 10 ASEAN countries must be respected among all defense officials.

ASEAN leaders in government, business and the defense-security services have vital roles in preparing the next generation of leadership to be able identify future areas of long-term collaboration in government, businesses and defense throughout East Asia. Likewise, foreign, home, trade and finance ministries will have to hone their knowledge and personal instincts to enhance leadership skills combining political, economic and military “situational awareness” with greater degrees of “technical competence”.

The combined but subtle applications of soft, smart and hard powers must become the overall learning processes in all ASEAN countries: Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam. This pool of human resources in the application of brain-warfare is ASEAN’s commitment to be counted in the East Asia rebalancing process.

Current and future generations of civilian, business and military officials in ASEAN, both at the national and local levels, must assume shared responsibility to secure the ASEAN Economic Community. Support from capable civilian, business and military leaders is crucial to the transformation of ASEAN into a credible entity within Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region as well as within the over-all global rebalancing act in the years to come.

The upcoming ASEAN Summit from May 7 to 9, 2011, provides an opportunity for its 10 member states to review the defense and security context of the continuing thrust as a pivotal regional grouping engaged in aligning major power interests in Southeast Asia. In strategic terms, there are five dimensions of military security that together define the political, economic and socio-cultural success of the ASEAN Security Community.

First, Satelllite-based cyber defense: the use of satellite communications technology to transmit, encrypt, capture and control the transmission and content of military communications in space, including tracking and intercepting systems utilized and deployed by the military.

The United States, Russia, Japan and China dominate space-based defense technology. European countries, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore provide first and second-tier advanced communications technology systems deployed by land, sea and air forces.

Second, Strategic Nuclear: nuclear weapons with high-grade explosive capability with launch-capabilities of over 6,500 kilometers from land, sea and air. The United States and Russia lead the field with over 8,000-12,000 strategic nuclear warheads with command and control capabilities. China and India have fewer warheads, shorter launches as well as lesser command and control capability.

Third, Ballistic Nuclear: nuclear weapons with launch capability at ranges of 1,500-2,000 kilometers.The United States, Russia, China, India, France, the United Kingdom and North Korea are states that possess warheads and delivery systems linked to tactical nuclear weapons, deployed in tandem with conventional forces.

Fourth, Tri-Service Conventional Defense: “The military balance” usually associated with distribution and the quality of conventional army, navy and air forces’ ability to defend territorial integrity and maintain “deterrence” in conventional terms. The US is the only power with Carrier Strike Group (CSG) capability in the region as well as worldwide.

Fifth, Undersea Capability: deployment of undersea nuclear powered/nuclear-weapon submarine deployment, armed with strategic missile strike capabilities. Only the United States has the range capability in terms of numbers and accuracy, with Russia, China and India actively developing anti-ship missile capability, designed at enhancing their respective “strategic space” and “far sea” presence.

The above macro-security dimensions underwrite both the intra-regional and trans-regional economic relations. Japan, South Korea and later China benefited from American “security assurance” that provided economic, trade and invesment commitments in the Pacific. ASEAN today has become a community of 10 nations with a combined GDP of US$1.4 trillion.

The security, trade and investment complementarities linking Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean are covered by America’s critical role as the “security assurance” underpinning trans-regional stability. It survived upheavals in Southeast Asia, periodic crises over the Taiwan Straits and occasional tensions in the Korean peninsula.

The rise of China and India as regional and global economic powers has given rise to a desire by both nations to enhance “strategic space” in their respective “core areas of national interest”, in Northeast Asia and the Indian Ocean respectively. China and India’s core area of security presence will be taken into greater account as each nation increases its conventional power capability and affects ASEAN’s stance on regional security.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)/ASEAN Security Community (ASC) aims to foster intra-regional links leading to market-driven economic prosperity. ASEAN+3 (Japan, South Korea, China), ASEAN+6 (Japan, South Korea, China, Australia, New Zealand, India) followed by ASEAN+8 with the entry of the United States and Russia in 2010, are enhancing the concept of regional security in an interconnected world.

The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting, since May 2006, has provided a vehicle for ASEAN to provide “strategic space” among resident powers as well as calibrate “technological parity” with extra-regional military powers in order that regional security and economic progress become mutually reinforcing.

All of these collaborative clusters need to be carefully harmonized with the right pitch of military presence. The fulcrum of strategic “balance of power” and the evolving “power of balance”, incorporating economic, financial (AMRO, the ASEAN Macro Economics Research Office), trade (ACFTA, ASEAN-China Free Trade Area), investment and energy interactions need to be carefully calibrated by all nations in the region. The entire Trans Pacific Partnership community constitutes 78 percent of world GDP.

The key issues for ASEAN and for Indonesia in particular for the next 10-15 years: How coordinated and synchronized will ASEAN’s public and private leaders be to harness a concerted vision about its geo-political location relative to its geo-economic competitive strength? Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore exemplify the imperative to utilize “brain power” in order “to live off” the rest of the world precisely because they do not possess natural resources.

What combination of “hard”, “soft” and “smart” powers must ASEAN’s leadership groups in the government, in the military and in private business command in order to be able to connect and cooperate with the US, Japan, China, Russia and India? Can the national security state cope with technological, economic and financial globalization? Can territorial defenses adapt to the functional aspects of global economic and financial competitiveness arising from the pervasive uses of technological innovation?

With a population of almost 500 million, ASEAN must adopt comprehensive policy visions simultaneously linking the global, the regional, the national, the provincial and the local levels. There is a need for more skilled and educationally trained civilian, business and military leaders who are skilled at interfacing the planning of “military battles” over physical space with areas where “non-military battles” of ideas, innovation, knowledge and financial and management skills become increasingly prominent in determining a nation’s ability to survive in a “24/7” competitive world.

Within the fused economies of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Pacific and the Indian Ocean, ASEAN’s notion of total defense and security must merge territorial defense with functional defense. The real test for each ASEAN country is to provide broad-based social and economic justice at home. Indonesia must ensure sustainable human security, from Aceh to Papua, from North Sulawesi to East Nusa Tenggara. In the final analysis, social and economic justice is Indonesia’s best defense. A strong and stable Indonesia is in the interest of all ASEAN and for security cooperation with all major extra-regional powers.

*) The article was an excerpt from the opening remarks at the 4th NADI (Network of ASEAN Defense Institutes) Workshop in Jakarta on April 19, 2011.

First it was GWOT (Global War On Terror). Then for a time it became SAVE (Strategy Against Violent Extremism). Later on, it became CONTEST (Counter Terrorism Strategy) with the 4 P’s of “Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare.”

Now, albeit unofficially, it’s OCO (Overseas Contingency Operations). When it comes to counter-terrorism, there has been no shortage of acronyms popping up in the bureaucracies of the security and intelligence communities in the United States and the United Kingdom.

GWOT first sprang up immediately after September 11, 2001, when President George W. Bush pronounced his famous “you’re either with us or with the terrorists” rallying call, understandable under the circumstances following the devastating attacks in New York and Washington at the time. To the credit of Jacques Chirac, who was the first foreign head of government to visit President Bush less than two weeks after 9/11, the French president expressed reservation over the choice of the word “war”.

Chirac understood the dangers of using the expression “war on terror”, and that it would elicit the notion of the war of the Christian “crusaders” against Islamic “jihadists” among France’s Muslim community, the largest in Western Europe. It would play into Al Qaida’s strategy of provoking tension between the “Christian West” and the “Muslim East”.

But GWOT became a popular rallying cry among right-wing and hard-line “security first” politicians in North America and Western Europe. It captured the imagination of bureaucrats who pushed for tighter domestic security policies against “potential” Muslim “sleepers” or “Trojan horse” subversives.

SAVE came into fashion around 2005-2006, when the “global war” pursued in Iraq, Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan persuaded politicians in the US and UK that a successful long-term strategy against Muslim terrorism had to go right to “cultural roots of the problem” in a particular country in the Middle East or South Asia. Kinetic-based counter-terrorist actions, including the use of special forces and UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) operated from Nevada often inadvertently targeted innocent civilians suspected of being involved in terrorist acts in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Over the past decade, intelligence chiefs throughout South East Asia have exchanged notes in facing radical groups who often manipulated Islamic notions of “jihad” by home grown, region-based as well as international-linked terrorist groups. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia undertook “re-integration programs” in which suspected terrorists or those convicted of violent acts are provided with “remedial programs” incorporating welfare related schemes as well as provide rehabilitation sessions guiding them to the true path of Muslim toleration.

The Indonesian Defense Force, particularly the Army, has discretely but effectively recalibrated its role to launch effective Territorial Capacity Buiding (TCB) programs. Its twin track schemes provide governance capacity building for village, local and township management as well as supporting economic development delivery systems. Reinforcing governance capacity and providing economic support (repair of irrigation canals, bridges, rehabilitating houses of worship in previously sectarian-strife areas, teaching arithmetic and Bahasa Indonesia in isolated areas) create a positive environment of “nation-building” and “nation replenishing” at the grass roots level.

This is the other side of GWOT, SAVE and OCO. The real issue is that of matching satellite-based and air launched technology of war should be calibrated with the ground-level anthropology challenge of graduated winning hearts and minds. GWOT, SAVE and OCO can only succeed if these ground level social, economic and cultural issues are resolved at the scope and speed willingly undertaken by local leaders.

My Keynote Remarks at the Joint Symposium on ASEAN Peacebuilding organized by Paramadina University and Harvard University at Paramadina University, Jakarta.

I congratulate Paramadina University and Harvard University for jointly organizing this timely symposium. It is fitting that we gather in this symposium on peace-building December 10 on the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For when we talk about post-conflict resolution and peace-building we must ultimately talk about human rights in all of its five dimensions: civil, political, economic, social and cultural. As the United Nations Human Rights Summit in Vienna in June 1993 aptly stipulates, those five dimensions must be integrated, inseparable and proportional in their implementation in all countries, regions and continents throughout the world. While acknowledging the universality of the Declaration, the Vienna Summit also recognized the imperative to take into consideration the “ region specific” as well as the “historical and cultural context” of human rights in each country. After all, the true meaning of human rights__and indeed of peace and justice__can only have relevance within a particular ground level national and cultural context.

Well before Indonesia proclaimed independence in August 1945, our founding fathers had for months debated the basis of state identity of the projected Indonesia nation. Although the Indonesian nation then, as now, had the largest number of Muslims in any single country, our founding fathers affirmed in Pancasila as our state identity, incorporating a sublime blend of all the major religions, beliefs and secular norms prevalent in our diverse cultures. This agreement on fundamentals was pioneered and had been fought for politically, diplomatically as well as militarily by Indonesians of all creeds, races, ethnic group and provincial origin. Our founding fathers decided that the unitary state of Indonesia should uphold and respect the rich diversity and mutual tolerance of all of the nation’s living religious, cultural, ethnic as well as racial heritages. A healthy sense of modern nationalism triumphed over narrow primordial loyalties.

Pancasila___Believe in God, Humanitarianism, Nationalism, Democracy through Deliberation and Social Justice__became our agreed basis of what constitutes Indonesian-ness. Pancasila defined the platform of our “peace charter” binding Achenese in the west and Papuans in the east, committing North Sulawesi citizens with the peoples in the island of Rote. We remain today the world’s largest Muslim majority country, but by deliberate consensual choice not an Islamic state. In the course of our post-independence period, this belief in the mystical and mythical quality of Indonesian unity and cohesion based on our interpretation of “unity in diversity” was adhered to by the vast majority of our social and political leaders, Muslim as well as non-Muslim. But like all charters, pledges and political symbolism, Pancasila as a nation-wide commitment can only endure if its underpinnings is supported by a robust and balanced fulfillment of all five dimensions of human rights__ civil liberties, political freedom , economic sustenance , social cohesion and cultural resilience . This is the only way we can replenished a greater sense of Indonesian-ness from generation to generation.

Most people advocating tolerance and diversity do so because by they enjoy civil and political liberties precisely and because their economic, social and cultural needs have been adequately met. It is a truism to say that “Where you stand depends on where you sit; where you sit depends on what you eat; what you eat depends on where you where born.” One defends the rule of law because one’s particular station in life has made it convenient and expedient to be “part of the system” and one’s economic, social and cultural foundations are already sound and secure.

Over the past 10 years, various Indonesian administrations have sought to strengthen our sense of political, economic and cultural cohesion stronger and more resilient by addressing several priority issues.

President S.B. Yudhoyono identified good governance as one of the key priorities in peace-building at all levels: national, provincial, local. Over the past 5 years, in regions afflicted by political, communal, sectarian and ethnic violence__Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Ambon and Papua___the Ministry of Defense (Dephan) and the Indonesian Defense Force (TNI) are fully committed to support graduated political democratization towards greater competence and capacity building in civilian government, including ground-level post-conflict resolution and peace-building.

The TNI’s role has shifted from leading and dominating to measured presence in support of building the five pillars of democratic governance: civil society, political parties, the police, the prosecutors office and the courts system. Community policing is supported by the TNI’s measured Territorial Capacity Building. Every governor, district and sub-district officer in all of our 33 provinces and 493 second-tier governmental bureaucracy recognize the need to emulate the code of the military profession. Provincial, district and sub-district bureaucracies are expected to adopt similar rotational schemes which are all-important for fostering national administrative capacity-building, as well as for effective managerial capacity down to the village level. Additionally, the TNI is tacitly assigned to help accelerate sustainable economic growth. Not merely growth with equity, but more critically growth through equity. Measured military presence at each level of economic growth help define the rate of governmental capacity building at all level: national, provincial and local.

Every generation of Indonesia’s soldiers and officers is involved in a constant process of day-to-day “nation-building” and “nation-replenishing.” From Aceh to Papua, Army soldiers teach grade school arithmetic, help build bridges, rehabilitate villages and irrigation canals, provide rudimentary health care. Navy sailors and marines provide crucial logistical support to remote or isolated islands. Air Force personnel fly and distribute emergency relief to post-conflict areas and to victims of natural disasters. Each deed reinforces the locals’ sense of being cared for and participating in a more vibrant nation-wide common endeavor. Where thresholds of tolerance regarding what constitutes equity and fairness can be tenuous and fickle, more often than not it is the local soldier who acts as the credible “cultural broker.” This is the enduring task of being a people’s defense force. We firmly believe that in the final analysis,. social justice is a nation’s best defense.

Muslims in Indonesia co-exists and are enriched by day-to-day interaction with the practices, rituals and symbols of fellow citizens other faiths and beliefs: Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. “Indonesian-ness” is not based on a single majority ethnic group such as the Javanese. Nor is it based on a dominant “cultural heritage” like Malay identity, though some parts of western Indonesia find affinity with Malay culture. And in the eastern half of our country there are more Melanesians than in all of Melanesia proper.

Military presence and democratic governance are directly linked to narrowing the vertical “rich-poor gap”, as well as the western-eastern horizontal disparities in our archipelago. Differentiated rates of access to new knowledge and skills may endanger our nation’s sense unity and cohesion. Measured political development and successful political democratization cannot be sustainable without broad-based economic democratization. Both political and economic democratization cannot succeed without constant cultural replenishing of being Indonesian at ground-level. In addressing domestic and international terrorism, interdicting financial networks and disrupting their organizational capacity, the arrest and prosecution of suspected perpetrators must be conducted on the terms of Indonesian authorities and under the provisions of our legal system. Discreet and timely foreign security assistance rendered “on tap” are much more legitimate and effective than aid provided through virulent “on top” pressure from abroad.

Ultimately, violent extremism can only be overcome by concerted efforts to reduce inequities in development, reduce corruption and accelerate programs in poverty reduction. The police, the prosecutors office and the courts system can only do so much in addressing issues related to our young citizens who out of desperation and destitute find salvation in misguided religious martyrdom through violent behavior. Local religious, social and youth leaders can and must do their part. We are working hard to reduce these grievances so that the poor will not have to take their own lives because they have nothing to lose. We have to persuade them that a far greater mission in life is not to dare to die, but to have the audacity to live and work hard towards a better future.

Keynote Address at the 11th Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense (CHOD-11) Conference, Bali, Indonesia, November 11, 2008.

We meet at a critical time in the geo-political and geo-economic setting of today’s world. This coming November 15, the powerful economies of the world___the United States (GDP: $ 14,5 trillion), the European Union (GDP: US 14,6 trillion) and Japan (GDP: US$ 4,6 trillion)__will meet in Washington for the G-20 Summit which aims to resolve the global financial market and economic crises which have afflicted many countries and regions across all continents. The Washington Summit follows the G-8 meeting in Hokkaido in September and last month’s Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Beijing.

CHOD-11 must take into account what will come out of the Washington Summit and its follow-up meetings. As the “center of gravity” of the world economy continue to shift from the North Atlantic to Asia and the Pacific, Japan, China, South Korea will play more significant roles in redesigning the global financial and economic orders. Sooner than later the crises will affect all of our economies, including the budget, force planning and operational capabilities of the defense forces. In turn, the crises will influence the security environment where trans-regional trade, investment and financial flows occur, ultimately impacting perceptions about future multilateral cooperation.

For over 60 years, the United States maintained “full spectrum dominance” in Asia and the Pacific. Throughout the Cold War (1947-1990) and beyond (1990- present). United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) held its role as “security provider,” enabling its treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) to secure 80% of energy supplies from the Middle East within a stable Northeast Asia-Southeast Asia-Indian Ocean environment. That security environment made possible Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and China to accumulate today’s combined GDP of US $ 11 trillion, whilst at the same time underwriting America’s trade and budget deficits. Growth of Asia Pacific coooperation, including the formation of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) in 1989 and the more recent East Asia Summit in 2005 were made possible by America’s ability to provide satellite surveillance, strategic nuclear, ballistic missile as well conventional forces “forward presence.”

Significantly, USPACOM secured both the intra-regional and trans-regional strategic balance. Japan provided economic, trade and invesment commitments, leading ASEAN to become today a community of 10 nations with a combined GDP of $1,2 trillion. The security, trade and investment complementarities linking Northeast and Southeast Asia were facilitated by USPACOM’s critical role as “regional balancer” adjusting to the shifts of trans-regional military balance over the past 60 yearss. It survived the upheavels in Indo-China (1954-1975), the crises over the Taiwan Straits and periodic tensions in the Korean peninsula.

The transformation from an alliance based SEATO to an independent Asean Regional Forum(ARF)/ASEAN Security Community (ASC) fostered inter-regional links leading to market-based economic prosperity. Indonesia’s vision within the ASC is to provide “strategic space” among all extra-regional and resident economic and military powers in order that multilateral cooperation, regional security and economic prosperity reinforces one another. In place of the former ANZUS (Ausralia-New Zealand-US) alliance, there now exists an informal quadrilateral security consultation forum involving the US, Japan, Australia and India.

CHOD in 21st Century must track trends and projections of Northeast and Southeast Asia with other transregional centers in Pacific Basin, including links with North America, Oceania, Australia/New Zealand and Latin America. USPACOM in Hawaii is strategically located to monitor trans-Pacific air and maritime trade, investments and financial interaction. As budgetary priorities shift, “regional cooperative clusters ” offer useful intersecting points in maintaining trans-regional stability: China-Japan-Korea in Northeast Asia; The ASEAN Security Community in Southeast Asia ; the US-Japan-Australia-India consultative framework.

All of these collaborative clusters need to be carefully harmonized with the right pitch of US military presence. The fulcrum of military “balance of power” and the evolving “power of balance” incorporating economic, financial, trade, investment and energy flows passing through the seas and airspaces of East and Southeast Asia, the Pacific and Indian Oceans were a carefully calibrated by USPACOM..

How will future multilateral cooperation fit into the above trends? How coordinated and synchronized will public and private leaders harness a concerted vision about each country’s geo-political distinct location relative to its geo-economic competitive strength? Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore exemplify the imperative to utilize “brain power” in order “to live off” the rest of the world precisely because they do not possess natural resources. What combination of “hard”, “soft” and “smart” powers must leadership groups in government, in the military and in private business command in order to be able to connect, cooperate and at the same time compete with one another as well as with the rest of the world?

What is the role of traditional “military power” compared to the growing importance of “non-military warfare” such as the “battle” over brain-ware, creativity, ideas and innovation? What is the optimum mix matching the ability to“deter and destruct” with the ability to “capture and secure ” market share, financial assets and intellectual property”? Countries with sizeable numbers of population and territory must adopt a comprehensive policy vision simultaneously linking the global, the regional, the national, the provincial and the local so that “access to” and “claims over” strategic resources in international legally disputed areas can be resolved through mediation and peaceful negotiation.

There is need for more skilled and educationally trained military officers who are able to interface the planning of “military battles” over physical space with areas where the “non-military battles” of ideas, knowledge and management skills become increasingly prominent in determining a nation’s ability to survive in a “24/7” globalized world. The “war room”, “board room” and the “classroom” must interface continously.

CHOD has a vital role in preparing next generation of military leaders able to map out a network of collaboration among young officers in the armies, navies and air forces throughout the Pacific. They will be more skilled in the combined applications of “hard” military power, “smart” economic-financial power as well as the “soft” power of culture and communication.

Only in this way can future generation military leaders and defense planners can ensure that the shared responsibility to secure sustainable multilateral cooperation, regional security and economic prosperity will justly reward our vision of planning ahead in keeping the peace in our region.

The Indonesian Defense Force was established from a myriad group of student movements, guerilla militias and irregulars representing diverse ethnic, religious and local identities preceding proclamation of Indonesian independence in August, 1945. These disparate forces were imbued with the fighting ethos that defined latter day Indonesia defense policy : “total people’s warfare, ” and subsequently “total defense and security.” Nationalism was, and continues today, to be the defining basis of the TNI’s (Indonesian Defense Force) world-view.

Today, all services of the TNI are defined as at once a fighting force (tentara kejuangan), a people’s force (tentara rakyat), a national force (tentara nasional) and a professional force (tentara profesional). Professionalism is deliberatedly subsumed under the three preceding spiritual elements. Once enlisted or commissioned, every Indonesian soldier, sailor, airman and marine is honor bound to personally act first and foremost as a citizen of Indonesia, and to professionally be “first in war, first in peace and first in emergency response.”

Army officers who went through their formative years at the National Military Academy in Magelang, uphold this professional commitment to serve as first and foremost as an Indonesian national. Like their colleagues who graduate from the Naval Academy in Surabaya and from Air Force Academy in Yogyakarta they are sworn to defend the tenets of our national ideology, the Pancasila: Belief in God, Humanitarianism, Nationalism, Democracy through Deliberation and Social Justice.

Defending Pancasila is an indispensable basis of our sense of national identity as well as for our constant revitalization of our sense of national purpose. But affirmation of Pancasila has its practical applications as well, not least in two critical areas in contemporary Indonesia.

First, the TNI is committed to support graduated political democratization towards greater competence and capacity building in civic government. More than 10 years ago and well before the reform process began in May 1998, Lieut.Gen. S.B. Yudhoyono led a group of senior Army officers in calling for a “redefining, repositioning and re-vitalizing” of the role of the Indonesian military in support of graduated civilian-based democratization. At present, the role of the Indonesian soldier has shifted from leading and dominating to measured presence backing up the four pillars of democratic governance : the police, the prosecutors office, the courts system and civil society.

Every governor, district and sub-district officer in all of our 33 provinces and 390 second-tier of governmental hureaucracy recognize the need to emulate the code of conduct of the Indonesian soldier. Each and every Indonesian remains proud of one’s ethnic, provincial or religious origin. But once a person is enlisted or commissioned into the profession of arms, the national interest transcends the interests of one’s particular primordial proclivities. Many Javanese, Sundanese, Sumatranese, Kalimantanese, Celebese and Balinese junior officers hailing from a particular place of birth is expected to serve in at least four different areas of command throughout eastern, central and western Indonesia before he gets his first star. Provincial, district and sub-district bureaucracies are expected to adopt similar tour-of-duty rotational schemes which are all-important for nation-wide administrative capacity-building, as well as for effective civilian “ground-level” democratization.

Secondly, the Indonesian military is assigned to help accelerate sustainable economic growth. Not merely growth with equity, but more critically growth through equity. Only robust underpinnings of social and economic justice at all levels of governance can safeguard our political transformation over the medium and long haul. Measured military presence at each level defines the success rate of governmental delivery systems in providing basic needs and essential services to the poor and the destitute.

Indonesia cannot take off into sustained growth without adequate security governance that help deliver basic needs (drinkable water, electricity, public housing, primary health care, basic education) more accessible to the 35 million Indonesians who live on less than 2 dollars a day. Every generation of soldiers and officers is involved in constant processed of “nation-building” and “nation-replenishing”. From Aceh to Papua, soldiers teach grade school arithmetic, help build bridges , rehabilitate irrigation systems, provide primary health care. Each deed reinforce the locals’ sense of participating in a more vibrant Indonesian common national endeavor. Thresholds of tolerance regarding what constitutes equity and fairness can be both tenuous and fickle at the ground level. More often than not it is the local soldier who acts as an effective and credible intermediary. This is the enduring duty of being a people’s defense force, for in a sense the prevalence of social justice is a nation’s best defense.

Equally important, though Indonesia has more Muslims than in any other country in the world, the affirmation of an inclusive nation-wide state identity (dasar negara) is not based on a single religion. Muslims in Indonesia co-exists and are enriched by day-to-day interaction with the practices, rituals and symbols of fellow citizens other faiths and beliefs: Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Neither is “Indonesian-ness” based on a majority ethnic group such as the Javanese; nor is it based on a “cultural stream” like the Malay heritage, though parts of western Indonesia find affinity with Malay culture. And there are more Melanesians in eastern Indonesia than in all of Melanesia proper.

Military presence and democratic governance is also directly linked to narrowing the vertical “rich-poor” gap, as well as the western-eastern horizontal divide of Indonesia. Differentiated rates of access to new knowledge and skills may endanger the nation’s sense unity and cohesion. Security governance provide that degree of political stability to enable us within the next 10 years to quadruple Indonesia’s GDP per capita from currently USD 2000 to USD 8000, and to quadruple the size of our middle class from 15% to roughly 50% of the population. There cannot be successful political democratization without sustainable broad-based economic democratization.

In addressing domestic and international terrorism, interdicting terrorist financial networks and disrupting their organizational capacity, the arrest and prosecution of suspected perpetrators must be conducted on the terms of Indonesian authorities and under the provisions of our legal system. Discreet and timely foreign security assistance rendered “on tap” is much more legitimate and effective than aid provided through virulent “on top” pressure from abroad.

In a globalized world, Indonesia’s younger generation of officer-corps that is more outward-looking, self-confident and competitive can learn much from their colleagues represented in this distinguished gathering from 30 countries throughout the Pacific region. For reasons of history, culture, tradition and geography, each of our land and security services may differ in the way we prepare for war. But in matters of human security, we must above all be guided by our sense of universal humility

Defense planning and management is a comprehensive endeavor that encompasses six different areas. There are three core areas: force, resource and weapon systems planning; and three supporting streams: logistics, C4SRI (command, control, communication computer, surveillance, reconnaissance, information) ), and civil emergency. Defense planning relates to other disciplines, such as air and naval technology development, standardization, intelligence, operational planning, and force generation.

Given the current economic constraints arising from the government’s limited budget( Rp 32 trillions or less than 1 % of GDP of Rp 5,220 trillion, and 4,6 % of annual budget of about Rp 780 trillion for fiscal 2008) the underlying theme of Indonesian defense planning for the near and mid-term future is to enhance efficiency by drastically reducing leakages and wastages, especially in the procurement and acquisitions of weapon systems, defense equipment and supplies.

Force planning
Force planning deals specifically with providing Indonesia with the forces and capabilities of the tri-services to execute their range of missions, in accordance with the Indonesia doctrine of total defence and security (sishankamrata). It seeks to ensure that Indonesia develop sustainable and interoperable forces, which can function even with limited or scarce budgetary resources.

The force planning process is based on three sequential elements: general political guidance, planning targets and defense reviews. Political guidance sets out the overall aims to be met, incorporating President S.B. Yudhoyono’s concept of Minimum Essential Force (MEF) that establishes in military terms the number, scale and nature of operational readiness and force structure that the country as a whole should at a minimum be able to deploy.

Planning targets include both a detailed determination of an integrated tri-service force (Tri-Matra Terpadu) requirements and the setting of implementation targets to fulfill those requirements. Defense reviews provide a means to assess the degree to which planning targets are being met. The term ‘force planning’ is often confused with that of ‘defense planning’, which is much broader (includes non-military defense planning), and that of ‘operational planning’, which is conducted for specific, tactical and command-level military operations, including balancing strike force, support and maintenance/repair capabilities.

Resources Planning
National resources comprise human resources, natural resources and man-made resources. National resource planning aims to provide the country with the capabilities it needs, but focuses on the elements that are joined in common funding; each service (Angkatan) pool resources within a nation-wide total defense framework.

Resource planning is closely linked to operational planning, which aims to ensure that the Indonesian Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) fulfill its present and minimum operational commitments and face new threats such as terrorism and bio-chemical weapons. There is a distinction between joint funding and common funding: joint funding covers activities, managed by the Ministry of Defense (Dephan) and TNI Headquarters (Mabes TNI), such as integrated acquisitions and procurement of common use items.

Common funding involves three different budgets: the civil budget, which covers the running costs of Dephan and Mabes TNI; the military budget, which essentially covers the running costs of TNI’s integrated command structure and the nation-wide communication and air defense networks; and the Defense Acquisitions Program that covers nation-wide procurement requirements for communication systems, air defense systems and networks of naval stations and bases, fuel supplies and command structures. The military budget and the Defense Acquisitions Program support the theatre headquarter elements for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Relatively speaking, these budgets represent a small amount of money, but they are important for the cohesion and the integration of capabilities of the tri-services.

Weapon Systems Planning
Weapon systems planning is one of the main constituting elements of Dephan’s defense planning process. It aims to support the country’s political and economic objectives and focuses on the development of inter-service (but not common-funded) programs. It does this by promoting cost-effective acquisition, co-operative development and graduated increased local production of weapons systems . It also encourages interoperability, and technological and industrial co-operation among the three services and related ministries and government agencies.

Dephan’s mandate is to cooperate closely with the Ministry of State Enterprises (Menneg BUMN) which has legal and financial control over five strategic industries: PT Pindad; PT PAL; PT Dana; PT LEN and PT DI; with the Ministry of Industry and the State Ministry for Science and Technology to prepare a long-term plan for developing defense industries which reduces reliance on foreign suppliers; and with the Ministry of Finance for purposes of fiscal accountability.

Logistics Planning
Logistics planning is an integral part of defense and operational planning. It aims to identify the different logistics capabilities that need to be acquired by the tri-services included in the Defense Planning Ministerial Guidance, and ensure that these capabilities are available to be used by the Command Units for operations. Logistics planning serves as the basis for the overarching cooperative logistics effort with the aim of improving the integration of national logistics planning processes during peace, crisis and conflict. At the force planning level, logistics planning consists of identification of the different civil and military capabilities that each service agree to acquire and to provide for joint-operations missions. The management of these capabilities in-theatre is then undertaken by Mabes TNI within the framework of the operational planning process.

C4SRI Planning
The effective performance of Indonesia’s political and military functions, requires the widespread utilization of Command, Control, Computer, Communication Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Information (C4SRI) systems, services and facilities, supported by appropriate personnel and agreed doctrine, organizations and procedures. C4SRI systems include communications, information, navigation and identification systems as well as sensor and warning installation systems, designed and operated in a networked and integrated form to meet the needs of the TNI. Individual C4SRI systems may be provided via common funded programs, or by joint-funded co-operative programs.

Co-ordinated C4SRI planning is an essential activity for the achievement of a nation-wide cohesive, cost-effective, interoperable and secure capability which can meet current and projected political and military requirements. It ensures that C4SRI activities conducted under all aspects of defense planning remain coherent throughout the life-cycle of systems and programs, and that end-products and services match real capability requirements.

C3I planning needs to encompass all elements needed for the achievement of capability. Capability does not just come from the provision of materiel (systems) and facilities, but also relies upon the existence of appropriate organization, training, logistics and personnel, and of relevant interoperability. In addition, the achievement of required system capability necessitates the application of a combination of the three core planning disciplines: resource, armaments and force planning. The C4SRI planning process influences and controls the activities of these planning areas to ensure a degree of coherence between them.

Civil Emergency Planning
Civil emergency planning has two basic dimensions: one dimension are the arrangements that are being made at the national level to protect civilian populations against the consequences of war, terrorist attacks, civic unrest and other major incidents or natural disasters. These include operational arrangements, such as disaster response coordination at national level. The other dimension is the planning to ensure that civil resources can be put to systematic and effective use in support of post-emergency strategy. In essence, this deals with the support that the civilian sector (e.g. transport, supply, communications) can give to the military, primarily in terms of civil support to the military in planning and operations, but also in terms of direct civilian support to crisis response operations.

In sum, civil emergency planning aims to coordinate national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in collective support of national strategic objectives. It is a national responsibility and civil assets remain under national control at all times. However, national capabilities are harmonized to ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and that necessary assets are readily available.

Selected Related Areas
There are a number of other related issues, which are closely linked to the defense planning process. These include air and naval technology planning, standardization, intelligence, operational planning, and force generation.

In brief, air defense planning enables members to harmonize their national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defense weapons. National air defense provides a network of interconnected systems enabling aircraft and tactical weapons to be detected either by maritime and ground-based systems or by interceptor aircraft. The extension of this air defense system with the civilian radar network is currently being considered by Dephan and the Ministry of Transportation (Dephub).

Naval technology planning aims to synchronize available domestic industry and foreign suppliers to ensure that maritime surveillance and defense match mid as well as long term requirements of deterrence as well as effective naval enforcement within and adjacent to Indonesia’s territorial seas.

Standardization is key to increasing the combined operational effectiveness of all military forces. It explores ways of improving cooperation and eliminating duplication in research, development, production, procurement and support of defense systems. Dephan leads in establishing industry standards, platforms and systems that affect production costs of key individual service requirements: e.g. infantry fighting vehicles for the Army, missile fast patrol boats for the Navy, transport aircraft for the Air Force.

Intelligence plays an important role in the defense planning process, in particular with the emergence of multidimensional security challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as strategic assessment capacity are essential to ensure maximum warning and preparation time to counter armed and terrorist attacks. Intelligence sets out the requirements for the improved provision, exchange and analysis of political, economic, security and military intelligence, and closer coordination of the intelligence producers.

Successful military operations require the preparation of detailed plans to ensure that all the relevant factors have been carefully anticipated and weighed. The number of such factors is potentially great and includes the size, location, and likely duration of an operation; the necessary command arrangements; the rules under which it will be conducted ; special requirements imposed by the terrain, weather, and the availability (or otherwise) of local government support and the state of the local infrastructure; appraises the intentions and capabilities of adversaries; the need to collaborate with regional and international organizations; possible humanitarian emergency services.

Operational planning allows Dephan and Mabes TNI to prepare both for possible situations and for crisis response operations like those involving interdiction of illegal activities related to maritime security, border area surveillance and enforcement of binding legal agreements. Dephan/Mabes TNI develops, and periodically refines, operational planning processes that produce both advance (or contingency) plans and crisis response plans.

An essential element of this process is the requirement for political control and approval from the chief executive, and, where required by law, in consultation with and the consent of, the Commission for Defense and Foreign Affairs of Parliament (Komisi I, DPR-RI). The planning process needs to be flexible enough to accommodate interactive exchanges of political direction and military advice and to adapt plans to evolving political guidance during a crisis.

Force generation is the process by which Dephan indicate what forces and capabilities they will make available, for what period of time, against a list of requirements that Mabes TNI have elaborated for a particular operation, in the light of an operation plan, or for special needs like deployment or rotations of the Rapid Response Force.

Dephan is seeking to tighten the links between defense planning, operation planning, and force generation so that defense planning will be more rigorously conducted on the basis of likely future operational requirements. On the other, operation planning and force generation will be more fully guided by information on what capabilities are, or are likely in the future to be available. Dephan is also improving the force generation process itself to make it more comprehensive and forward-looking in the light of the country’s archipelagic structure.

Framework for Dephan’s defense planning and management process
In practical terms, there is need to standardize defense planning processes and defense management cycles. Each one of the services often devise individual and independent planning procedures and apply specific management methods unique to its mission. They also contribute differently to the overall aim of providing Dephan with the forces and capabilities to undertake the full range of its missions.

With the differences between the various components of the defense planning process and interrelated management areas, the need for harmonization and coordination is essential. While force planning has provided a basis for this harmonization and coordination, more was required. Dephan has directed the Agency for Research and Development (Balitbang)and Agency for Management Training(Badiklat) agencies to produce a comprehensive political guidance in support of the General Policy for National Defense.

Efforts to enhance and coordinate defense management are not limited to just within Dephan and Mabes TNI. Dephan needs to keep abreast of policy and strategic decisions undertaken by related ministries, especially the ministries for finance, national planning, industry, research and technology, maritime and fisheries, public works, energy and mineral resources.

The overall objective is to effectively and efficiently apply the capability requirements needed by utilizing the full range of human, natural as well as financial resources available to the government and to the nation as a whole.

In an interview with CNBC’s Martin Soong,…