Now, albeit unofficially, it’s OCO (Overseas Contingency Operations). When it comes to counter-terrorism, there has been no shortage of acronyms popping up in the bureaucracies of the security and intelligence communities in the United States and the United Kingdom.

GWOT first sprang up immediately after September 11, 2001, when President George W. Bush pronounced his famous “you’re either with us or with the terrorists” rallying call, understandable under the circumstances following the devastating attacks in New York and Washington at the time. To the credit of Jacques Chirac, who was the first foreign head of government to visit President Bush less than two weeks after 9/11, the French president expressed reservation over the choice of the word “war”.

Chirac understood the dangers of using the expression “war on terror”, and that it would elicit the notion of the war of the Christian “crusaders” against Islamic “jihadists” among France’s Muslim community, the largest in Western Europe. It would play into Al Qaida’s strategy of provoking tension between the “Christian West” and the “Muslim East”.

But GWOT became a popular rallying cry among right-wing and hard-line “security first” politicians in North America and Western Europe. It captured the imagination of bureaucrats who pushed for tighter domestic security policies against “potential” Muslim “sleepers” or “Trojan horse” subversives.

SAVE came into fashion around 2005-2006, when the “global war” pursued in Iraq, Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan persuaded politicians in the US and UK that a successful long-term strategy against Muslim terrorism had to go right to “cultural roots of the problem” in a particular country in the Middle East or South Asia. Kinetic-based counter-terrorist actions, including the use of special forces and UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) operated from Nevada often inadvertently targeted innocent civilians suspected of being involved in terrorist acts in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Over the past decade, intelligence chiefs throughout South East Asia have exchanged notes in facing radical groups who often manipulated Islamic notions of “jihad” by home grown, region-based as well as international-linked terrorist groups. Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia undertook “re-integration programs” in which suspected terrorists or those convicted of violent acts are provided with “remedial programs” incorporating welfare related schemes as well as provide rehabilitation sessions guiding them to the true path of Muslim toleration.

The Indonesian Defense Force, particularly the Army, has discretely but effectively recalibrated its role to launch effective Territorial Capacity Buiding (TCB) programs. Its twin track schemes provide governance capacity building for village, local and township management as well as supporting economic development delivery systems. Reinforcing governance capacity and providing economic support (repair of irrigation canals, bridges, rehabilitating houses of worship in previously sectarian-strife areas, teaching arithmetic and Bahasa Indonesia in isolated areas) create a positive environment of “nation-building” and “nation replenishing” at the grass roots level.

This is the other side of GWOT, SAVE and OCO. The real issue is that of matching satellite-based and air launched technology of war should be calibrated with the ground-level anthropology challenge of graduated winning hearts and minds. GWOT, SAVE and OCO can only succeed if these ground level social, economic and cultural issues are resolved at the scope and speed willingly undertaken by local leaders.

I congratulate Paramadina University and Harvard University for jointly organizing this timely symposium. It is fitting that we gather in this symposium on peace-building December 10 on the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For when we talk about post-conflict resolution and peace-building we must ultimately talk about human rights in all of its five dimensions: civil, political, economic, social and cultural. As the United Nations Human Rights Summit in Vienna in June 1993 aptly stipulates, those five dimensions must be integrated, inseparable and proportional in their implementation in all countries, regions and continents throughout the world. While acknowledging the universality of the Declaration, the Vienna Summit also recognized the imperative to take into consideration the “ region specific” as well as the “historical and cultural context” of human rights in each country. After all, the true meaning of human rights__and indeed of peace and justice__can only have relevance within a particular ground level national and cultural context.

Well before Indonesia proclaimed independence in August 1945, our founding fathers had for months debated the basis of state identity of the projected Indonesia nation. Although the Indonesian nation then, as now, had the largest number of Muslims in any single country, our founding fathers affirmed in Pancasila as our state identity, incorporating a sublime blend of all the major religions, beliefs and secular norms prevalent in our diverse cultures. This agreement on fundamentals was pioneered and had been fought for politically, diplomatically as well as militarily by Indonesians of all creeds, races, ethnic group and provincial origin. Our founding fathers decided that the unitary state of Indonesia should uphold and respect the rich diversity and mutual tolerance of all of the nation’s living religious, cultural, ethnic as well as racial heritages. A healthy sense of modern nationalism triumphed over narrow primordial loyalties.

Pancasila___Believe in God, Humanitarianism, Nationalism, Democracy through Deliberation and Social Justice__became our agreed basis of what constitutes Indonesian-ness. Pancasila defined the platform of our “peace charter” binding Achenese in the west and Papuans in the east, committing North Sulawesi citizens with the peoples in the island of Rote. We remain today the world’s largest Muslim majority country, but by deliberate consensual choice not an Islamic state. In the course of our post-independence period, this belief in the mystical and mythical quality of Indonesian unity and cohesion based on our interpretation of “unity in diversity” was adhered to by the vast majority of our social and political leaders, Muslim as well as non-Muslim. But like all charters, pledges and political symbolism, Pancasila as a nation-wide commitment can only endure if its underpinnings is supported by a robust and balanced fulfillment of all five dimensions of human rights__ civil liberties, political freedom , economic sustenance , social cohesion and cultural resilience . This is the only way we can replenished a greater sense of Indonesian-ness from generation to generation.

Most people advocating tolerance and diversity do so because by they enjoy civil and political liberties precisely and because their economic, social and cultural needs have been adequately met. It is a truism to say that “Where you stand depends on where you sit; where you sit depends on what you eat; what you eat depends on where you where born.” One defends the rule of law because one’s particular station in life has made it convenient and expedient to be “part of the system” and one’s economic, social and cultural foundations are already sound and secure.

Over the past 10 years, various Indonesian administrations have sought to strengthen our sense of political, economic and cultural cohesion stronger and more resilient by addressing several priority issues.

President S.B. Yudhoyono identified good governance as one of the key priorities in peace-building at all levels: national, provincial, local. Over the past 5 years, in regions afflicted by political, communal, sectarian and ethnic violence__Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Ambon and Papua___the Ministry of Defense (Dephan) and the Indonesian Defense Force (TNI) are fully committed to support graduated political democratization towards greater competence and capacity building in civilian government, including ground-level post-conflict resolution and peace-building.

The TNI’s role has shifted from leading and dominating to measured presence in support of building the five pillars of democratic governance: civil society, political parties, the police, the prosecutors office and the courts system. Community policing is supported by the TNI’s measured Territorial Capacity Building. Every governor, district and sub-district officer in all of our 33 provinces and 493 second-tier governmental bureaucracy recognize the need to emulate the code of the military profession. Provincial, district and sub-district bureaucracies are expected to adopt similar rotational schemes which are all-important for fostering national administrative capacity-building, as well as for effective managerial capacity down to the village level. Additionally, the TNI is tacitly assigned to help accelerate sustainable economic growth. Not merely growth with equity, but more critically growth through equity. Measured military presence at each level of economic growth help define the rate of governmental capacity building at all level: national, provincial and local.

Every generation of Indonesia’s soldiers and officers is involved in a constant process of day-to-day “nation-building” and “nation-replenishing.” From Aceh to Papua, Army soldiers teach grade school arithmetic, help build bridges, rehabilitate villages and irrigation canals, provide rudimentary health care. Navy sailors and marines provide crucial logistical support to remote or isolated islands. Air Force personnel fly and distribute emergency relief to post-conflict areas and to victims of natural disasters. Each deed reinforces the locals’ sense of being cared for and participating in a more vibrant nation-wide common endeavor. Where thresholds of tolerance regarding what constitutes equity and fairness can be tenuous and fickle, more often than not it is the local soldier who acts as the credible “cultural broker.” This is the enduring task of being a people’s defense force. We firmly believe that in the final analysis,. social justice is a nation’s best defense.

Muslims in Indonesia co-exists and are enriched by day-to-day interaction with the practices, rituals and symbols of fellow citizens other faiths and beliefs: Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. “Indonesian-ness” is not based on a single majority ethnic group such as the Javanese. Nor is it based on a dominant “cultural heritage” like Malay identity, though some parts of western Indonesia find affinity with Malay culture. And in the eastern half of our country there are more Melanesians than in all of Melanesia proper.

Military presence and democratic governance are directly linked to narrowing the vertical “rich-poor gap”, as well as the western-eastern horizontal disparities in our archipelago. Differentiated rates of access to new knowledge and skills may endanger our nation’s sense unity and cohesion. Measured political development and successful political democratization cannot be sustainable without broad-based economic democratization. Both political and economic democratization cannot succeed without constant cultural replenishing of being Indonesian at ground-level. In addressing domestic and international terrorism, interdicting financial networks and disrupting their organizational capacity, the arrest and prosecution of suspected perpetrators must be conducted on the terms of Indonesian authorities and under the provisions of our legal system. Discreet and timely foreign security assistance rendered “on tap” are much more legitimate and effective than aid provided through virulent “on top” pressure from abroad.

Ultimately, violent extremism can only be overcome by concerted efforts to reduce inequities in development, reduce corruption and accelerate programs in poverty reduction. The police, the prosecutors office and the courts system can only do so much in addressing issues related to our young citizens who out of desperation and destitute find salvation in misguided religious martyrdom through violent behavior. Local religious, social and youth leaders can and must do their part. We are working hard to reduce these grievances so that the poor will not have to take their own lives because they have nothing to lose. We have to persuade them that a far greater mission in life is not to dare to die, but to have the audacity to live and work hard towards a better future.

We meet at a critical time in the geo-political and geo-economic setting of today’s world. This coming November 15, the powerful economies of the world___the United States (GDP: $ 14,5 trillion), the European Union (GDP: US 14,6 trillion) and Japan (GDP: US$ 4,6 trillion)__will meet in Washington for the G-20 Summit which aims to resolve the global financial market and economic crises which have afflicted many countries and regions across all continents. The Washington Summit follows the G-8 meeting in Hokkaido in September and last month’s Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Beijing.

CHOD-11 must take into account what will come out of the Washington Summit and its follow-up meetings. As the “center of gravity” of the world economy continue to shift from the North Atlantic to Asia and the Pacific, Japan, China, South Korea will play more significant roles in redesigning the global financial and economic orders. Sooner than later the crises will affect all of our economies, including the budget, force planning and operational capabilities of the defense forces. In turn, the crises will influence the security environment where trans-regional trade, investment and financial flows occur, ultimately impacting perceptions about future multilateral cooperation.

For over 60 years, the United States maintained “full spectrum dominance” in Asia and the Pacific. Throughout the Cold War (1947-1990) and beyond (1990- present). United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) held its role as “security provider,” enabling its treaty allies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) to secure 80% of energy supplies from the Middle East within a stable Northeast Asia-Southeast Asia-Indian Ocean environment. That security environment made possible Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and China to accumulate today’s combined GDP of US $ 11 trillion, whilst at the same time underwriting America’s trade and budget deficits. Growth of Asia Pacific coooperation, including the formation of APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) in 1989 and the more recent East Asia Summit in 2005 were made possible by America’s ability to provide satellite surveillance, strategic nuclear, ballistic missile as well conventional forces “forward presence.”

Significantly, USPACOM secured both the intra-regional and trans-regional strategic balance. Japan provided economic, trade and invesment commitments, leading ASEAN to become today a community of 10 nations with a combined GDP of $1,2 trillion. The security, trade and investment complementarities linking Northeast and Southeast Asia were facilitated by USPACOM’s critical role as “regional balancer” adjusting to the shifts of trans-regional military balance over the past 60 yearss. It survived the upheavels in Indo-China (1954-1975), the crises over the Taiwan Straits and periodic tensions in the Korean peninsula.

The transformation from an alliance based SEATO to an independent Asean Regional Forum(ARF)/ASEAN Security Community (ASC) fostered inter-regional links leading to market-based economic prosperity. Indonesia’s vision within the ASC is to provide “strategic space” among all extra-regional and resident economic and military powers in order that multilateral cooperation, regional security and economic prosperity reinforces one another. In place of the former ANZUS (Ausralia-New Zealand-US) alliance, there now exists an informal quadrilateral security consultation forum involving the US, Japan, Australia and India.

CHOD in 21st Century must track trends and projections of Northeast and Southeast Asia with other transregional centers in Pacific Basin, including links with North America, Oceania, Australia/New Zealand and Latin America. USPACOM in Hawaii is strategically located to monitor trans-Pacific air and maritime trade, investments and financial interaction. As budgetary priorities shift, “regional cooperative clusters ” offer useful intersecting points in maintaining trans-regional stability: China-Japan-Korea in Northeast Asia; The ASEAN Security Community in Southeast Asia ; the US-Japan-Australia-India consultative framework.

All of these collaborative clusters need to be carefully harmonized with the right pitch of US military presence. The fulcrum of military “balance of power” and the evolving “power of balance” incorporating economic, financial, trade, investment and energy flows passing through the seas and airspaces of East and Southeast Asia, the Pacific and Indian Oceans were a carefully calibrated by USPACOM..

How will future multilateral cooperation fit into the above trends? How coordinated and synchronized will public and private leaders harness a concerted vision about each country’s geo-political distinct location relative to its geo-economic competitive strength? Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore exemplify the imperative to utilize “brain power” in order “to live off” the rest of the world precisely because they do not possess natural resources. What combination of “hard”, “soft” and “smart” powers must leadership groups in government, in the military and in private business command in order to be able to connect, cooperate and at the same time compete with one another as well as with the rest of the world?

What is the role of traditional “military power” compared to the growing importance of “non-military warfare” such as the “battle” over brain-ware, creativity, ideas and innovation? What is the optimum mix matching the ability to“deter and destruct” with the ability to “capture and secure ” market share, financial assets and intellectual property”? Countries with sizeable numbers of population and territory must adopt a comprehensive policy vision simultaneously linking the global, the regional, the national, the provincial and the local so that “access to” and “claims over” strategic resources in international legally disputed areas can be resolved through mediation and peaceful negotiation.

There is need for more skilled and educationally trained military officers who are able to interface the planning of “military battles” over physical space with areas where the “non-military battles” of ideas, knowledge and management skills become increasingly prominent in determining a nation’s ability to survive in a “24/7” globalized world. The “war room”, “board room” and the “classroom” must interface continously.

CHOD has a vital role in preparing next generation of military leaders able to map out a network of collaboration among young officers in the armies, navies and air forces throughout the Pacific. They will be more skilled in the combined applications of “hard” military power, “smart” economic-financial power as well as the “soft” power of culture and communication.

Only in this way can future generation military leaders and defense planners can ensure that the shared responsibility to secure sustainable multilateral cooperation, regional security and economic prosperity will justly reward our vision of planning ahead in keeping the peace in our region.

Today, all services of the TNI are defined as at once a fighting force (tentara kejuangan), a people’s force (tentara rakyat), a national force (tentara nasional) and a professional force (tentara profesional). Professionalism is deliberatedly subsumed under the three preceding spiritual elements. Once enlisted or commissioned, every Indonesian soldier, sailor, airman and marine is honor bound to personally act first and foremost as a citizen of Indonesia, and to professionally be “first in war, first in peace and first in emergency response.”

Army officers who went through their formative years at the National Military Academy in Magelang, uphold this professional commitment to serve as first and foremost as an Indonesian national. Like their colleagues who graduate from the Naval Academy in Surabaya and from Air Force Academy in Yogyakarta they are sworn to defend the tenets of our national ideology, the Pancasila: Belief in God, Humanitarianism, Nationalism, Democracy through Deliberation and Social Justice.

Defending Pancasila is an indispensable basis of our sense of national identity as well as for our constant revitalization of our sense of national purpose. But affirmation of Pancasila has its practical applications as well, not least in two critical areas in contemporary Indonesia.

First, the TNI is committed to support graduated political democratization towards greater competence and capacity building in civic government. More than 10 years ago and well before the reform process began in May 1998, Lieut.Gen. S.B. Yudhoyono led a group of senior Army officers in calling for a “redefining, repositioning and re-vitalizing” of the role of the Indonesian military in support of graduated civilian-based democratization. At present, the role of the Indonesian soldier has shifted from leading and dominating to measured presence backing up the four pillars of democratic governance : the police, the prosecutors office, the courts system and civil society.

Every governor, district and sub-district officer in all of our 33 provinces and 390 second-tier of governmental hureaucracy recognize the need to emulate the code of conduct of the Indonesian soldier. Each and every Indonesian remains proud of one’s ethnic, provincial or religious origin. But once a person is enlisted or commissioned into the profession of arms, the national interest transcends the interests of one’s particular primordial proclivities. Many Javanese, Sundanese, Sumatranese, Kalimantanese, Celebese and Balinese junior officers hailing from a particular place of birth is expected to serve in at least four different areas of command throughout eastern, central and western Indonesia before he gets his first star. Provincial, district and sub-district bureaucracies are expected to adopt similar tour-of-duty rotational schemes which are all-important for nation-wide administrative capacity-building, as well as for effective civilian “ground-level” democratization.

Secondly, the Indonesian military is assigned to help accelerate sustainable economic growth. Not merely growth with equity, but more critically growth through equity. Only robust underpinnings of social and economic justice at all levels of governance can safeguard our political transformation over the medium and long haul. Measured military presence at each level defines the success rate of governmental delivery systems in providing basic needs and essential services to the poor and the destitute.

Indonesia cannot take off into sustained growth without adequate security governance that help deliver basic needs (drinkable water, electricity, public housing, primary health care, basic education) more accessible to the 35 million Indonesians who live on less than 2 dollars a day. Every generation of soldiers and officers is involved in constant processed of “nation-building” and “nation-replenishing”. From Aceh to Papua, soldiers teach grade school arithmetic, help build bridges , rehabilitate irrigation systems, provide primary health care. Each deed reinforce the locals’ sense of participating in a more vibrant Indonesian common national endeavor. Thresholds of tolerance regarding what constitutes equity and fairness can be both tenuous and fickle at the ground level. More often than not it is the local soldier who acts as an effective and credible intermediary. This is the enduring duty of being a people’s defense force, for in a sense the prevalence of social justice is a nation’s best defense.

Equally important, though Indonesia has more Muslims than in any other country in the world, the affirmation of an inclusive nation-wide state identity (dasar negara) is not based on a single religion. Muslims in Indonesia co-exists and are enriched by day-to-day interaction with the practices, rituals and symbols of fellow citizens other faiths and beliefs: Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Neither is “Indonesian-ness” based on a majority ethnic group such as the Javanese; nor is it based on a “cultural stream” like the Malay heritage, though parts of western Indonesia find affinity with Malay culture. And there are more Melanesians in eastern Indonesia than in all of Melanesia proper.

Military presence and democratic governance is also directly linked to narrowing the vertical “rich-poor” gap, as well as the western-eastern horizontal divide of Indonesia. Differentiated rates of access to new knowledge and skills may endanger the nation’s sense unity and cohesion. Security governance provide that degree of political stability to enable us within the next 10 years to quadruple Indonesia’s GDP per capita from currently USD 2000 to USD 8000, and to quadruple the size of our middle class from 15% to roughly 50% of the population. There cannot be successful political democratization without sustainable broad-based economic democratization.

In addressing domestic and international terrorism, interdicting terrorist financial networks and disrupting their organizational capacity, the arrest and prosecution of suspected perpetrators must be conducted on the terms of Indonesian authorities and under the provisions of our legal system. Discreet and timely foreign security assistance rendered “on tap” is much more legitimate and effective than aid provided through virulent “on top” pressure from abroad.

In a globalized world, Indonesia’s younger generation of officer-corps that is more outward-looking, self-confident and competitive can learn much from their colleagues represented in this distinguished gathering from 30 countries throughout the Pacific region. For reasons of history, culture, tradition and geography, each of our land and security services may differ in the way we prepare for war. But in matters of human security, we must above all be guided by our sense of universal humility

Given the current economic constraints arising from the government’s limited budget( Rp 32 trillions or less than 1 % of GDP of Rp 5,220 trillion, and 4,6 % of annual budget of about Rp 780 trillion for fiscal 2008) the underlying theme of Indonesian defense planning for the near and mid-term future is to enhance efficiency by drastically reducing leakages and wastages, especially in the procurement and acquisitions of weapon systems, defense equipment and supplies.

Force planning
Force planning deals specifically with providing Indonesia with the forces and capabilities of the tri-services to execute their range of missions, in accordance with the Indonesia doctrine of total defence and security (sishankamrata). It seeks to ensure that Indonesia develop sustainable and interoperable forces, which can function even with limited or scarce budgetary resources.

The force planning process is based on three sequential elements: general political guidance, planning targets and defense reviews. Political guidance sets out the overall aims to be met, incorporating President S.B. Yudhoyono’s concept of Minimum Essential Force (MEF) that establishes in military terms the number, scale and nature of operational readiness and force structure that the country as a whole should at a minimum be able to deploy.

Planning targets include both a detailed determination of an integrated tri-service force (Tri-Matra Terpadu) requirements and the setting of implementation targets to fulfill those requirements. Defense reviews provide a means to assess the degree to which planning targets are being met. The term ‘force planning’ is often confused with that of ‘defense planning’, which is much broader (includes non-military defense planning), and that of ‘operational planning’, which is conducted for specific, tactical and command-level military operations, including balancing strike force, support and maintenance/repair capabilities.

Resources Planning
National resources comprise human resources, natural resources and man-made resources. National resource planning aims to provide the country with the capabilities it needs, but focuses on the elements that are joined in common funding; each service (Angkatan) pool resources within a nation-wide total defense framework.

Resource planning is closely linked to operational planning, which aims to ensure that the Indonesian Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) fulfill its present and minimum operational commitments and face new threats such as terrorism and bio-chemical weapons. There is a distinction between joint funding and common funding: joint funding covers activities, managed by the Ministry of Defense (Dephan) and TNI Headquarters (Mabes TNI), such as integrated acquisitions and procurement of common use items.

Common funding involves three different budgets: the civil budget, which covers the running costs of Dephan and Mabes TNI; the military budget, which essentially covers the running costs of TNI’s integrated command structure and the nation-wide communication and air defense networks; and the Defense Acquisitions Program that covers nation-wide procurement requirements for communication systems, air defense systems and networks of naval stations and bases, fuel supplies and command structures. The military budget and the Defense Acquisitions Program support the theatre headquarter elements for the Army, Navy and Air Force. Relatively speaking, these budgets represent a small amount of money, but they are important for the cohesion and the integration of capabilities of the tri-services.

Weapon Systems Planning
Weapon systems planning is one of the main constituting elements of Dephan’s defense planning process. It aims to support the country’s political and economic objectives and focuses on the development of inter-service (but not common-funded) programs. It does this by promoting cost-effective acquisition, co-operative development and graduated increased local production of weapons systems . It also encourages interoperability, and technological and industrial co-operation among the three services and related ministries and government agencies.

Dephan’s mandate is to cooperate closely with the Ministry of State Enterprises (Menneg BUMN) which has legal and financial control over five strategic industries: PT Pindad; PT PAL; PT Dana; PT LEN and PT DI; with the Ministry of Industry and the State Ministry for Science and Technology to prepare a long-term plan for developing defense industries which reduces reliance on foreign suppliers; and with the Ministry of Finance for purposes of fiscal accountability.

Logistics Planning
Logistics planning is an integral part of defense and operational planning. It aims to identify the different logistics capabilities that need to be acquired by the tri-services included in the Defense Planning Ministerial Guidance, and ensure that these capabilities are available to be used by the Command Units for operations. Logistics planning serves as the basis for the overarching cooperative logistics effort with the aim of improving the integration of national logistics planning processes during peace, crisis and conflict. At the force planning level, logistics planning consists of identification of the different civil and military capabilities that each service agree to acquire and to provide for joint-operations missions. The management of these capabilities in-theatre is then undertaken by Mabes TNI within the framework of the operational planning process.

C4SRI Planning
The effective performance of Indonesia’s political and military functions, requires the widespread utilization of Command, Control, Computer, Communication Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Information (C4SRI) systems, services and facilities, supported by appropriate personnel and agreed doctrine, organizations and procedures. C4SRI systems include communications, information, navigation and identification systems as well as sensor and warning installation systems, designed and operated in a networked and integrated form to meet the needs of the TNI. Individual C4SRI systems may be provided via common funded programs, or by joint-funded co-operative programs.

Co-ordinated C4SRI planning is an essential activity for the achievement of a nation-wide cohesive, cost-effective, interoperable and secure capability which can meet current and projected political and military requirements. It ensures that C4SRI activities conducted under all aspects of defense planning remain coherent throughout the life-cycle of systems and programs, and that end-products and services match real capability requirements.

C3I planning needs to encompass all elements needed for the achievement of capability. Capability does not just come from the provision of materiel (systems) and facilities, but also relies upon the existence of appropriate organization, training, logistics and personnel, and of relevant interoperability. In addition, the achievement of required system capability necessitates the application of a combination of the three core planning disciplines: resource, armaments and force planning. The C4SRI planning process influences and controls the activities of these planning areas to ensure a degree of coherence between them.

Civil Emergency Planning
Civil emergency planning has two basic dimensions: one dimension are the arrangements that are being made at the national level to protect civilian populations against the consequences of war, terrorist attacks, civic unrest and other major incidents or natural disasters. These include operational arrangements, such as disaster response coordination at national level. The other dimension is the planning to ensure that civil resources can be put to systematic and effective use in support of post-emergency strategy. In essence, this deals with the support that the civilian sector (e.g. transport, supply, communications) can give to the military, primarily in terms of civil support to the military in planning and operations, but also in terms of direct civilian support to crisis response operations.

In sum, civil emergency planning aims to coordinate national planning activity to ensure the most effective use of civil resources in collective support of national strategic objectives. It is a national responsibility and civil assets remain under national control at all times. However, national capabilities are harmonized to ensure that jointly developed plans and procedures will work and that necessary assets are readily available.

Selected Related Areas
There are a number of other related issues, which are closely linked to the defense planning process. These include air and naval technology planning, standardization, intelligence, operational planning, and force generation.

In brief, air defense planning enables members to harmonize their national efforts with international planning related to air command and control and air defense weapons. National air defense provides a network of interconnected systems enabling aircraft and tactical weapons to be detected either by maritime and ground-based systems or by interceptor aircraft. The extension of this air defense system with the civilian radar network is currently being considered by Dephan and the Ministry of Transportation (Dephub).

Naval technology planning aims to synchronize available domestic industry and foreign suppliers to ensure that maritime surveillance and defense match mid as well as long term requirements of deterrence as well as effective naval enforcement within and adjacent to Indonesia’s territorial seas.

Standardization is key to increasing the combined operational effectiveness of all military forces. It explores ways of improving cooperation and eliminating duplication in research, development, production, procurement and support of defense systems. Dephan leads in establishing industry standards, platforms and systems that affect production costs of key individual service requirements: e.g. infantry fighting vehicles for the Army, missile fast patrol boats for the Navy, transport aircraft for the Air Force.

Intelligence plays an important role in the defense planning process, in particular with the emergence of multidimensional security challenges such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance as well as strategic assessment capacity are essential to ensure maximum warning and preparation time to counter armed and terrorist attacks. Intelligence sets out the requirements for the improved provision, exchange and analysis of political, economic, security and military intelligence, and closer coordination of the intelligence producers.

Successful military operations require the preparation of detailed plans to ensure that all the relevant factors have been carefully anticipated and weighed. The number of such factors is potentially great and includes the size, location, and likely duration of an operation; the necessary command arrangements; the rules under which it will be conducted ; special requirements imposed by the terrain, weather, and the availability (or otherwise) of local government support and the state of the local infrastructure; appraises the intentions and capabilities of adversaries; the need to collaborate with regional and international organizations; possible humanitarian emergency services.

Operational planning allows Dephan and Mabes TNI to prepare both for possible situations and for crisis response operations like those involving interdiction of illegal activities related to maritime security, border area surveillance and enforcement of binding legal agreements. Dephan/Mabes TNI develops, and periodically refines, operational planning processes that produce both advance (or contingency) plans and crisis response plans.

An essential element of this process is the requirement for political control and approval from the chief executive, and, where required by law, in consultation with and the consent of, the Commission for Defense and Foreign Affairs of Parliament (Komisi I, DPR-RI). The planning process needs to be flexible enough to accommodate interactive exchanges of political direction and military advice and to adapt plans to evolving political guidance during a crisis.

Force generation is the process by which Dephan indicate what forces and capabilities they will make available, for what period of time, against a list of requirements that Mabes TNI have elaborated for a particular operation, in the light of an operation plan, or for special needs like deployment or rotations of the Rapid Response Force.

Dephan is seeking to tighten the links between defense planning, operation planning, and force generation so that defense planning will be more rigorously conducted on the basis of likely future operational requirements. On the other, operation planning and force generation will be more fully guided by information on what capabilities are, or are likely in the future to be available. Dephan is also improving the force generation process itself to make it more comprehensive and forward-looking in the light of the country’s archipelagic structure.

Framework for Dephan’s defense planning and management process
In practical terms, there is need to standardize defense planning processes and defense management cycles. Each one of the services often devise individual and independent planning procedures and apply specific management methods unique to its mission. They also contribute differently to the overall aim of providing Dephan with the forces and capabilities to undertake the full range of its missions.

With the differences between the various components of the defense planning process and interrelated management areas, the need for harmonization and coordination is essential. While force planning has provided a basis for this harmonization and coordination, more was required. Dephan has directed the Agency for Research and Development (Balitbang)and Agency for Management Training(Badiklat) agencies to produce a comprehensive political guidance in support of the General Policy for National Defense.

Efforts to enhance and coordinate defense management are not limited to just within Dephan and Mabes TNI. Dephan needs to keep abreast of policy and strategic decisions undertaken by related ministries, especially the ministries for finance, national planning, industry, research and technology, maritime and fisheries, public works, energy and mineral resources.

The overall objective is to effectively and efficiently apply the capability requirements needed by utilizing the full range of human, natural as well as financial resources available to the government and to the nation as a whole.

In an interview with CNBC’s Martin Soong,…

Prepared for meeting of Defense Minister with soldiers and family of the Army Strategic Reserve’s Combat Reconnaissance Company, Jakarta, 24 April 2008.

Tanya 1: Pertanyaan yang diajukan prajurit Kitaipur Kostrad adalah: bagaimana Departemen Pertahanan memodernisasikan kemampuan TNI dengan memanfaatkan teknologi informasi yang lebih maju, agar tidak ketinggalan dengan negara-negara tetangga?

Question 1: Questions posed by a soldier from the Combat Reconnaissance Company of the Army Strategic Reserve is: How is the Ministry of Defense modernizing the Defense Force’s capability through the application of advanced information technology, in order to keep abreast with the forces of neighbouring countries?

Jawaban 1: Departemen Pertahanan melalui Badan Litbang, Badan Diklat dan Pusat Data dan Informasi melakukan penelitian bersama untuk mempersiapkan terciptanya sistem peperangan berbasis jaringan, sehingga kemajuan yang dicapai di semua jenis industri elektronik di dalam negeri dipantau dan diupayakan dapat mendukung sistim komunikasi tri matra terpadu. Dengan demikian setiap jaringan komando dan kendali akan semakin mudah melaksanakan operasi militer berbasis jaringan terpadu dan meningkatkan effsiensi gelar pasukan maupun gelar bantuan menghadapi tanggap darurat akibat bencana manusia atau pun bencana alam.

Answer 1: The Defense Department through its Research and Development and Education and Training Agencies as well as its Center for Data and Information is undertaking joint studies and research to prepare the establishment of a Network Centric Warfare system, synergizing all domestic electronic industries towards building an integrated tri-service communications command system. All this will lead to a more unified command and control network which would facilitate more efficient military operations commands for purposes of troop deployment as well as for undertaking speedy emergency response in face of man-made as well as natural disasters.

Tanya 2: Apakah Departemen Pertahanan mengembangkan program peningkatan kualitas pengetahuan dan ketrampilan prajurit guna menghadapi tantangan kualitas sumber daya manusia dalam era globalisasi?

Question 2: Is the Department of Defense developing programs to enhance the quality of knowledge and skills of soldiers to face the challenges of human resources-based competition in an increasingly globalized world?

Jawaban 2: Semua jajaran Dephan sedang diperkenalkan dengan apa yang disebut “Perang Sumber Daya Manusia”. Karena itu, pada setiap jenjang ketentaraan maupun pegawai negeri sipil, Departemen Pertahanan ikut membantu pengembangan ketrampilan para prajurit beserta anggota keluarganya. Setiap orang yang lebih siap menghadapi perang ketrampilan dan perang pengetahuan akan menyumbang langsung pada pertahanan non-militer. Dalam perekonomian global, kemampuan “perang otak” dan “perang selisih keunggulan” akan menentukan kualitas pertahanan bangsa dalam arti luas.

Answer 2: At all levels, Department of Defense personnel are being introduced to the concept of “Human Resources Warfare”. As many of all military as well as civilian personnel and their family members as possible are being encouraged to be aware of and be engaged in this “ battle of knowledge” and “battle of skills” and contribute to the overall capability of the nation in the field of non-military defense. In a globalized economy, the ability to be engaged in “the war of brainware” and the “war of margins of excellence” will ultimately decide a nation’s overall defense capability.

The staple line of argument among liberal media circles in the West is that the “military junta” or “military regime” in Myanmar and Pakistan need to be changed into liberal democracies along the lines of what politicians, legislators and media pundits in America and Britain seemed to be obsessed with. The illusion that Aung San Suu Kyi, Benazir Bhutto and/or Nawaz Sharif and their coterie of politicos/lawyers are able to devise a alternative, competent and unifying “democratic”political system remains a strong and, at the same time, naive and dangerous one.

Some 8 years ago, at the residence of the British ambassador in Jakarta, I was invited to meet for tea with Michael Aris, husband of Aung San Suu Kyi. I asked him pointedly whether the National League for Democracy which his wife headed was really a viable political organization that could galvanise a sense of national purpose among Myanmar’s civic society, particularly among Shans, Karens, Kachens and other minorities. His answer was so carefully guarded that I did not press the point. I had earlier remarked to him that (then) Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri was still grappling with forging unity within her PDIP party. In other words, for the NLD and PDIP there were limits to riding on the on the charisma of Aung San and Soekarno, to which both Syuu Kyi’s and Megawat relied upon for their influence and legitimacy.

Aris and I both agreed that presenting a viable political alternative to the military would have to be one of the priorities of all Aung San Suu Kyi’s followers within Myanmar as well as self exciled Myanmarese residing in Thailand, Western Europe and North America. However powerful the military in its power grip , social and economic changes were taking place within the country which required adjustment on the part of the military. Deep down, Myanmar was undergoing vast economic and political changes similar to what took place during the final 10 years of President Soehartos’s rule in Indonesia. The key issue was defining the scope and pace of change engaging with the military.

In Indonesia, the political structure of the ruling Golkar, the military and the bureaucracy established in the 1970s and mid 1980s had served its purpose of providing stability but since the 1990s had felt the need to gradually adjust and adapt. As with Indonesia in the 1990s, Myanmar post 2000 was changing fast, and the Myanmar military leadership felt it had to adjust to the realities of Myanmar’s growing political and economic interaction with the outside world, not just with its ASEAN co-member states. In fact, a hybrid political transitional arrangement was in the cards since late mid 1990s, recognising the need on both sides to define how much change and how much continuity would be mutually agreeable and realistically feasible. The unsaid transition period would be “a generation”, which means at least 15-20 years.

Similarly with Pakistan. General Musharraf may have outlived his legitimacy and political hold as leader of a “front-line state” in the West’s war against terrorism. But it is important to recall that when he came to power in October 1999, the Pakistani political public had been fed up with the constant gibbering, grab and greed politics of the Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif governments of the previous eight years. Not to speak of the associated role of “the infamous 22 families” which for long controlled the levers of political and economic power since Pakistan’s independence. Just as in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, contending ruling civil and military elites have always been beholden to the 3 C’s (Chinese Crony Conglomerates) dispensing business and monetary favours in return for political recognition and protection.

The real issue, then, is: do the civilian leaders and their fast-talking lawyers, NGO types and politicians in Myanmar and Pakistan have a credible and presentable alternative to military dominance? Have they also realised that a hybrid “military-civilian transitional system” is the true and only viable one, until the much vaunted “institution building”__political, economic, social__ underpins a truly functioning and sustainable democracy based on a committed civilian based middle class?

BBC World TV is airing a series on “Why Democracy?” based on a survey in several countries across the world it conducted last August. I suspect that it will contain the underlying taxonomy of what the often insufferably condescending British like to claim as Anglo Saxon superiority as pioneers of modern political and parliamentary democracy. It will make little note of the historical, cultural and economic backdrop of how democracies are defined, applied and reinterpreted in terms of each country’s historical cultural and economic context. But then the BBC, The British Council and the English language itself, is the last best hope of what Churchill called the need to capture “the empires of the mind” in the wake of Britain’s imperial decline.

More sanity is called for about the future prospects of graduated political and economic democracy in Mmyanmar and Pakistan. Instant democracy___openness, free press, rule of law, transparency and other accountability features____are fine for those who can afford it. But for those who still live in despair and desperation, it would be naïve and dangerous to think that feisting Western style democracy would bring about instant solutions on the ground. Witness the current state of the “democracy project” in Iraq and Afganistan.

Western media have used such variants of expressions ranging from “Islamic fundamentalism”, “Islamic terrorism”, “Islamic Jihadists”, and even “Islamic Fascists”. Toxic television, rabble ras well as trash tabloids are prone to use these caricatures. They feed on one another in ways “fact” becomes fiction, and fiction “ ignites” facts.

The Muslim world as a whole has suffered from this massive media manipulation. It has given rise to many different set of perceptions about “clashes within civilizations,” including among Muslims in the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia. You can also say that it is a clash of ideas about civilizations across all continents.

The “Clash of Civilizations” was first publicly raised in 1993 in an article written in Foreign Affairs magazine by Professor Samuel Huntington , and it is useful to remind ourselves of the context of when and why the question of clash of civilizations was brought up at the time.

First, it appeared in the wake of the “victory” of liberal capitalism over communism symbolized by the unification of two Germanies in October and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December. Earlier, the January 1991 Gulf War over Kuwait added the sense of western triumphalism. American hegemonism was at its peak.

Second, the crises in the Middle East and the rise of militant Islamist movements against Western interests throughout the world in the mid 1980s began to be perceived in the West that “Radical Islam” would supplant Communism as the principal challenge for the world-wide ideological contest. Bombings against western interests in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and the Gulf region resulted in the rise of faith-based neo-conservatism in the United States.

Thereafter, the events of September 11, 2001 confirmed the notion in the West that there would be a world-wide contest between the liberal capitalist world led by the United States and the Islamic world led by Usamah Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda movement.

While there may be superficial truth about this world-wide contest for ideological supremacy, the fact of the matter is that there were even more serious clashes within civilizations, both in “the West” as well as in the “Muslim world”. Within the Western world, there began a series of political cleavages between Christian fundamentalists and progressive schools both in the Protestant as well as Catholic churches, in North America, Europe as well as in Latin America.

In the United States, the Christian right representing various church denominations became powerful in influencing both domestic and foreign policy debates. From prayer in schools, abortion, gay marriages, stem cell research, to preaching Christian civilization and feisting western-style “democracy” abroad, these self righteous views influenced the perception that the current American administration has been strong influenced by the right wing constituencies. In Europe, crises of identity among Muslims within each of the European democracies in part have been compounded by worries over illegal immigration.

Contrary to popular opinion both in the West and within the Muslim world itself, there began serious clashes about civilization in the Islamic world itself. While a tiny minority may have been attracted to the motion of a “world wide caliphate” imbued by Islamic values as propounded by Usamah Bin Laden, there have been different “realities ” at the ground level.

Serious differences of the interpretation of Islam in Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia began to proliferate. Differing interpretations of the practical application of Muslim values are present in the Middle East among and within each Arab state, between Arab states and Iran, between the larger Middle East and Turkey, between Muslims in Pakistan and Muslims in India. And indeed, among Muslims within Malaysia, Indonesia.

Ultimately, it is the clash of local political interests that define conflict in the Middle East. Much of the root causes of these conflict rests on tribal rivalry and clan contests for access to status, group privilege, personal power or combination of the three. As we meet in this room tonight, the Palestine Authority is divided by factionalism between Fatah and Hamas which ironically, has little to do with Islamic values. In contemporary Iraq, violent clashes occur between Sunnis and Shites, as well as among Sunni parochial groups. And then there are thecriminals and thugs who profit from incessant chaos. The issue of anti-Americanism is marginal to all of these situations.

Historically, the Muslim world in the Middle East has been marginalised by the juxtaposition of three issues: one, the Palestine-Israel conflict going back to the early 20th century; two, the nexus of energy dependence and strategic military projection of the West going back to the 1930s; three, the conflicting claims by Islam, Christianity, and the Jewish religion over heritage of the holy sites in the region.

After decades of so many “Middle East peace processes” involving presidents, prime ministers, chancellors, kings, sultan, emirs, special envoys, rapporteurs and good offices, there has to date been no international initiative that has been able to sustain the painstaking tribal and clan accords that are imperative to make any progress viable. Thus far, all manner of agreements have unravelled by these micro dimensions of clashes of civilization.

Indonesia has often been seen as a model “moderate” Muslim country which can play a significant contributing role to the peace process in the Middle East. But we all realise that the realities of the Muslim world in the Middle East is strikingly different from the situation in Southeast Asia. We must not be too tempted to preach, much less transpose, our version of Islam to the situation in the Arab world in particular and to the Middle East in general. The history, geography, culture and the regional strategic context of the Middle east and Southeast Asia are vastly too different to have any immediate practical relevance.

Within Indonesia itself, there is much work to be done in the days, months and years ahead to prevent and mitigate clashes within our own micro civilizations at the ground level. From Aceh to Papua, from Northen Sulawesi to the south in Rote, the challenges of alleviating mass poverty needs to be addressed in tandem with continuing cooperation and dialogue among Muslims, Protestants, Catholics, Hindus, Buddhists and Confucians.

The effective delivery of food, adequate housing, clean water, primary health care, affordable utilities and employment to the 39 million who live off on less than 2 dollars a day and the 10 million openly jobless are sources of profound challenges to all Muslim leaders of the Muhammadiyah, the NU, and all Islam-based parties and civic groups represented in this hall.

For myself, it is a source of pride and hope that many of you who recently established this Centre have worked together with friends and colleagues from other faiths to rebuild schools, mosques, churches, and health care facilities after the many devastating social conflicts throughout Indonesia over the past 9 years.

While we may enjoy and enrich ourselves intellectually in gatherings of seminars, workshops and even in launch events such as here, we can only pre-empt clashes among our religious communities if we together cooperate in providing basic human needs to the poorest members of each of our constituents.

As we all work hard towards a fairer and just society, let us through the work of this Centre enhance our sense of tolerance among our faiths by appreciating the salient features of our respective religious precepts, rituals and norms. Let us commit ourselves to ensuring that many, if not all, of those whom we seek to alleviate from wrenching poverty can at least have the audacity of hope that their lives can improve within their life-time.

Realistically, we cannot in the near term save them all. There will be many who will have to go through a series of glitches and crashing of cultural gears, before things get better. But let us in this hall tonight pledge ourselves to resolving these ground-level issues as quickly as is humanely possible.

Only then can we be vindicated by our common commitment that this Centre is serious not only in promoting dialogue and cooperation among Indonesians of all faiths, but can provide real- world practical solutions on the ground that replenishes the true traditions of pluralism, tolerance and openness within the widening embrace of Indonesian-ness . Let us conduct dialogue and work cooperatively. Let us all practice what we preach.

Poverty in Indonesia, measured in income terms, affect 48% of Indonesia’s total population of 220 million. The government’s Medium Term Development Program (Rencana Jangka Menengah, RPJM) aims to reduce the poverty head count from 18.2 percent in 2004 to roughly 8.4 percent by 2009. When the plan was announced in the first cabinet meeting in late October 2004, no one foresaw the various domestic and international crises that would severely affect the trajectory of the poverty reduction programs.

Following the tsunami in late December 2004, there occurred earthquakes, mudflows, rice crises, the spike in international oil price rises and a host of residual social and ethnic conflicts throughout the archipelago arising from the crises of 7-8 years before. In addition, other natural and man-made disasters severely diverted the government’s resources to effectively alleviate poverty at the scope and speed that was originally targeted in late October 2004.

The World Bank’s Jakarta Office, in its outstanding report “Making the New Indonesia Work for The Poor” (November 2006) makes a clear case for the urgency that in addition to income-poverty, Indonesia still faces a long and difficult journey in pursuing programs to drastically reduce non-income poverty: malnutrition among a quarter of all children below the age of five; high maternal mortality rates (307 deaths in 100.00 births); education outcomes remain weak (among 16-18 year olds from the poorest quintile, only 55 percent completed junior high school (Sekolah Menengah Pertama, SMP); access to safe and clean water is slow (43 percent in rural areas, 78 percent in urban areas for the lowest quintile).

What do all these issues have to do with the Department of Defense and the Indonesian Defense Force (Tentara Nasional Indonesia,TNI)? The answer is starkly clear: plenty.

First, the Department of Defense and the TNI is committed to providing an effective and accountable delivery system in support of a still essentially weak civic governance and civil competence at all levels. Governmental capability __especially outside Java__still need the support of a carefully measured and calibrated role of the military in support of civic competence. Political crises, economic collapse and social unrest resulting from the financial crises in 1997-1998 led to incendiary violence among marginalised groups deprived of jobs, livelihood and of hope.

Throughout 1998-2003 overly drastic and immediate political openness in an environment of mass poverty, unemployment and fear of an uncertain future led to paroxysms of “the virility of violence” which gave rise to sectarian, ethnic and intra-regional enmity. The backlash against perceived heavy handedness of the military during the Soeharto years led to an exaggerated sense of “politically correct” but unrealistic notions of “democratic governance” among political parties, NGOs and other civic groups, all of whom remain too fragmented, too-disjointed and simply incompetent to provide ground-level work political stability.

Second, with respect to the TNI as a national force , as the people’s force, and as fighting defence force (tentara nasional, tentara rakyat, tentara kejuangan), the TNI has always been true to its commitment to assist those most deprived from access to basic human needs. The army, navy and air force has historically been engaged since the mid-1950s to initiate and support various people-centered projects at the ground level: building simple people’s housing, dams and irrigation channels; help set up affordable health care through the various medical units and battalions in villages, sub-districts, even at provincial level; non-coms have chipped in to stand in as teachers in Bahasa Indonesia and basic numeracy. In short, the TNI had preceded involvement in the very projects that the World Bank Jakarta Office Report focuses upon: non-income poverty, especially in the rural areas.

Finally, the Department of Defense and the TNI have pioneered policy and operational programs in attacking poverty as Indonesia’s version of the war on terror. Although poverty by itself do not correlated directly with acts of organized terrorism, the number of both income poor and non-income poor in Indonesia affects the our determination to wage war against the three main sources of terrorism world-wide.

First, inequities in development. With nearly half of our population living below the poverty line, there is urgent need to speed up programs that immediately mitigate disparities in income as well as distortions in access to basic human needs. Those who fall from the 2 dollar a day category to the 1,55 dollar a day category constitutes this margin of danger where young men or women disenfranchised economically may turn to desperate measures or attracted to radical ideologies.

Second, poverty eradication. As the people’s defense force, the TNI is obliged to be engaged in all government related poverty eradication schemes, to prove that the notion of a vigilant defense force can only credible if it true to its motion of caring and sharing with those who have yet to be lifted from abject poverty. Equally important, because the defense force realises that in the overall notion of defense in the wider sense, a just and equal society is the best defense.

Finally, anti-corruption. The Defense Department have completed a two-year program in transferring assets of all units of cooperatives, foundation and businesses to an inter-agency panel from the Departments of Defense, Finance, State Enterprises and Law & Human Rights.

A Presidential Decree establishing a National Agency to assess these assets and reconfigure all manners of “military businesses” is pending. Past military businesses have been identified with large-scale corruption abuses of human rights and pervasive repression. Having successfully pioneered an anti-corruption drive within is own house, the Department of Defense and the TNI have in fact deprived critics of the decades old ammunition of “an octopus-like” military-business complex.

Indonesia’s war on poverty and terrorism has along way to go. There will be glitches and crashing of social gears over the next ten to fifteen years. But the overall trajectory will remain on course and positive. There are even firmer grounds for optimism that Indonesia’s war against poverty will give substance to the notion: “Be tough against terrorism, but be tougher still against the sources of terrorism”. The Department of Defense has led the way.